All language subtitles for 26-09-2023cdddtye

Exchange of blows. What is happening
on the front and in the rear?

Over the past two weeks, Ukraine has destroyed: a
submarine carrying Kalibras; a large landing ship;

several Russian air defense nodes; the command
post and main stationary headquarters of the

Russian Black Sea Fleet; almost 400 artillery
systems; and military facilities on Russian

territory. Ukrainian drones flying into
Russian facilities is already the norm.

The elimination of the Russian presence
on drilling platforms in the Black Sea

has made it easier for the Ukrainian
Air Force to operate in the Black Sea.

At the same time, Russia destroyed
a hotel in Odessa, a kindergarten,

the office of a civilian shipping
company, several other civilian

facilities, and attempted to damage energy
infrastructure, but success is highly doubtful.

In general, Ukrainian defense forces are
getting closer to destroying the Russian

air defense infrastructure in Crimea and
the entire South, which will make it much

easier to de-occupy the Zaporizhzhia and
Kherson regions and blockade the peninsula.

Creates a constant threat to Russian
forces in the waters of the Black Sea.

Which will gradually reduce missile
pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure.

AFU forces destroy the artillery potential of
the Russian Armed Forces and de-mechanize the

Russian army as a whole. Russia loses
as much armored vehicles in a couple

of months as Russia produces in an entire year,
according to optimistic estimates for Russians.

It brings closer the blockade of Crimea.
Although it is still a long way off,

fundamental preparations are in full swing, and
after the blockade there will be liberation.

In general, the same trend that we have been
observing for the last 19 months continues:

gradually, the technical advantage that Russia had
at the beginning of the invasion is being leveled.

This does not mean that Russia is not doing
everything possible to increase the production

of the types of weapons available to it. It does,
of course. But Russia's industrial potential is

very limited compared to the Soviet era and
not comparable to that of NATO countries,

and Ukraine's allies. Do you like
HIMARS the way the Russians like them?

Yes, when you hear that "Russia has increased
production of something there by X times" - it

is always advisable to look at the base
of comparison. Because a 2-fold increase

in car production in Korea is a lot. A 10-fold
increase in the production of complex products

in Russia is, as a rule, a transition from
piece production to small-scale production.

The main argument Russia can use to prolong
its occupation is a full-blown second wave of

mobilization. And then a third. And a fourth.
In connection with the general decrease in

the mechanization of the Russian army and the
gradual increase of mechanization in the AFU,

this could turn the war into a competition
of "meat against a technological army".

We should not think that this will happen
tomorrow, but the trends are exactly like this.

The other thing is that Putin does
realize how dangerous this style

of compensating for technological losses can be.

Opportunities for training mobilized people in
Russia have not expanded over the past year,

either physically or in terms of personnel who
can train mobilized people. The first wave of

mobilization was the biggest test of Putin's
popularity and legitimacy. That is why there

is still no second wave, although it was needed
after the failure of the "winter offensive".

The main thing for Ukraine and for its
partners is not to do big stupid things (and

I will not explain what that means, but I will
definitely read your options in the comments).

And of course Ukraine should be provided with
all the weapons and resources that the Ukrainian

Liberation Forces needs to gradually suppress the
aggressor. This is what needs to be worked on.

Thank you for your attention.