All language subtitles for Terms.And.Conditions.May.Apply.2013.720p.BluRay.x264.AAC-[YTS.MX]

af Afrikaans
sq Albanian
am Amharic
ar Arabic
hy Armenian
az Azerbaijani
eu Basque
be Belarusian
bn Bengali
bs Bosnian
bg Bulgarian
ca Catalan
ceb Cebuano
ny Chichewa
zh-CN Chinese (Simplified)
zh-TW Chinese (Traditional)
co Corsican
hr Croatian
cs Czech
da Danish
nl Dutch
en English
eo Esperanto
et Estonian
tl Filipino
fi Finnish
fr French
fy Frisian
gl Galician
ka Georgian
de German
el Greek
gu Gujarati
ht Haitian Creole
ha Hausa
haw Hawaiian
iw Hebrew
hi Hindi
hmn Hmong
hu Hungarian
is Icelandic
ig Igbo
id Indonesian
ga Irish
it Italian
ja Japanese
jw Javanese
kn Kannada
kk Kazakh
km Khmer
ko Korean
ku Kurdish (Kurmanji)
ky Kyrgyz
lo Lao
la Latin
lv Latvian
lt Lithuanian
lb Luxembourgish
mk Macedonian
mg Malagasy
ms Malay
ml Malayalam
mt Maltese
mi Maori
mr Marathi
mn Mongolian
my Myanmar (Burmese)
ne Nepali
no Norwegian
ps Pashto
fa Persian
pl Polish
pt Portuguese
pa Punjabi
ro Romanian Download
ru Russian
sm Samoan
gd Scots Gaelic
sr Serbian
st Sesotho
sn Shona
sd Sindhi
si Sinhala
sk Slovak
sl Slovenian
so Somali
es Spanish Download
su Sundanese
sw Swahili
sv Swedish
tg Tajik
ta Tamil
te Telugu
th Thai
tr Turkish
uk Ukrainian
ur Urdu
uz Uzbek
vi Vietnamese
cy Welsh
xh Xhosa
yi Yiddish
yo Yoruba
zu Zulu
or Odia (Oriya)
rw Kinyarwanda
tk Turkmen
tt Tatar
ug Uyghur
Would you like to inspect the original subtitles? These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,000 --> 00:00:07,000 Downloaded from YTS.MX 2 00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:13,000 Official YIFY movies site: YTS.MX 3 00:00:25,305 --> 00:00:30,233 ♪ (music) ♪ 4 00:00:34,624 --> 00:00:36,488 (clicking to submit) 5 00:00:38,543 --> 00:00:40,351 (clicking to submit) 6 00:00:42,899 --> 00:00:44,762 (clicking to submit) 7 00:00:46,510 --> 00:00:48,350 (clicking to submit) 8 00:00:51,751 --> 00:00:54,295 ♪ (music) ♪ 9 00:01:07,711 --> 00:01:09,304 (clicking to submit) 10 00:01:18,535 --> 00:01:22,223 ♪ (music) ♪ 11 00:01:23,547 --> 00:01:25,965 (gulping) 12 00:01:26,673 --> 00:01:28,939 (unintelligible mumbling) 13 00:01:29,154 --> 00:01:31,420 (unintelligible mumbling) 14 00:01:31,588 --> 00:01:34,041 (unintelligible mumbling) 15 00:01:34,242 --> 00:01:36,116 (gulping) 16 00:01:36,424 --> 00:01:39,806 ♪ (music) ♪ 17 00:01:41,206 --> 00:01:43,260 (elevator opening) 18 00:01:44,307 --> 00:01:46,313 ♪ (music) ♪ 19 00:02:23,448 --> 00:02:27,384 (ads popping sound) 20 00:03:11,615 --> 00:03:13,574 (storm approaching) 21 00:03:17,948 --> 00:03:20,403 (scratching) 22 00:03:21,795 --> 00:03:24,279 ♪ (music) ♪ 23 00:03:25,975 --> 00:03:28,732 (narrator) Just about every time we use the Internet, 24 00:03:28,752 --> 00:03:30,160 a communication link, 25 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:31,399 or an app, 26 00:03:31,419 --> 00:03:34,040 we agree to some very long terms and conditions 27 00:03:34,040 --> 00:03:36,587 but, what exactly are we agreeing to? 28 00:03:36,587 --> 00:03:38,787 You guys, you gotta help me! 29 00:03:38,787 --> 00:03:41,030 These geeks in their casual jeans they're trying to kidnap me! 30 00:03:41,030 --> 00:03:42,207 What?! 31 00:03:42,207 --> 00:03:43,698 It's crazy dude! They're saying it 32 00:03:43,698 --> 00:03:46,403 because I've agreed to their latest terms and conditions on iTunes! 33 00:03:46,403 --> 00:03:48,957 Why? What the terms and conditions for the last update say? 34 00:03:48,957 --> 00:03:50,990 I don't know, I didn't read them! 35 00:03:50,990 --> 00:03:52,509 You didn't read them?! 36 00:03:52,509 --> 00:03:55,976 Who the hell reads the entire thing every time it pops up?! 37 00:03:56,215 --> 00:03:57,449 I do. 38 00:03:57,509 --> 00:04:00,167 Can you tell... can Apple tell 39 00:04:00,197 --> 00:04:02,858 how many people actually read it? 40 00:04:04,508 --> 00:04:08,087 - Well, they have to say that they agree-- - Right 41 00:04:08,338 --> 00:04:11,299 We can't know for sure if they read. 42 00:04:11,439 --> 00:04:14,244 We try to make it in plain English and very short. 43 00:04:14,775 --> 00:04:19,357 If I were trying to make a user agreement uninviting 44 00:04:19,727 --> 00:04:22,003 I would choose a small font, a sensor font, 45 00:04:22,003 --> 00:04:24,051 - and I would set it in all caps-- - OK. 46 00:04:24,131 --> 00:04:25,457 Because what happens then, 47 00:04:25,497 --> 00:04:27,912 is that your have a type that becomes a texture, 48 00:04:27,942 --> 00:04:29,928 rather than words and spaces. 49 00:04:29,968 --> 00:04:33,019 No one -- (laughter) has read the terms and conditions! 50 00:04:33,099 --> 00:04:35,318 No one in the world! (laughter) -- No one! 51 00:04:35,358 --> 00:04:38,568 Even the lawyers who wrote it, wrote it like this! (laughter) 52 00:04:38,618 --> 00:04:40,584 You come to a website and they have a set of rules 53 00:04:40,634 --> 00:04:42,300 usually described in the terms of service, 54 00:04:42,300 --> 00:04:43,992 and then you have a privacy policy, 55 00:04:43,992 --> 00:04:46,540 and as soon as you start using the service, 56 00:04:46,570 --> 00:04:49,626 in essence you have agreed to their terms of service and their privacy policy. 57 00:04:49,836 --> 00:04:51,968 (interviewer)"Do these terms and conditions that we sign up for... 58 00:04:51,968 --> 00:04:53,554 "...even apply?" 59 00:04:53,764 --> 00:04:56,600 They do. I think if they didn't apply, 60 00:04:56,650 --> 00:04:58,742 I think the web will topple over. 61 00:04:58,802 --> 00:05:01,250 And so, to the extent there have been contract decisions, 62 00:05:01,280 --> 00:05:04,051 and they held that these terms and conditions are valid. 63 00:05:04,392 --> 00:05:07,488 (narrator) And this concept is pretty new... for instance, 64 00:05:07,518 --> 00:05:10,603 you never had to sign an user's agreement for an old fashion landline, 65 00:05:10,663 --> 00:05:12,022 or to watch TV, 66 00:05:12,102 --> 00:05:13,327 or to read a book. 67 00:05:13,377 --> 00:05:14,518 But if you use a smart phone, 68 00:05:14,598 --> 00:05:15,961 a Kindle, 69 00:05:16,030 --> 00:05:17,336 or you watch Hulu, 70 00:05:17,376 --> 00:05:18,565 then you do. 71 00:05:18,615 --> 00:05:21,769 Violet, baby, don't you sign anything! What's this all about? 72 00:05:21,839 --> 00:05:23,643 A standard form of contract. 73 00:05:23,643 --> 00:05:25,174 Don't talk to me about contracts, Wonka, 74 00:05:25,214 --> 00:05:27,587 I use them myself, they're strictly for suckers. 75 00:05:27,997 --> 00:05:30,113 Yes, but you wouldn't begrudge me a little protection. 76 00:05:30,173 --> 00:05:32,963 (narrator) In fact, if you were to read everything you agree to, 77 00:05:33,012 --> 00:05:36,275 it would take one full month of work out of every year. 78 00:05:36,386 --> 00:05:39,033 That's 180 hours you would need to spend 79 00:05:39,153 --> 00:05:40,899 every year. 80 00:05:41,338 --> 00:05:43,309 And according to the Wall Street Journal, 81 00:05:43,450 --> 00:05:46,509 consumers lose 250 billion dollars each year 82 00:05:46,599 --> 00:05:48,895 due to what's hidden in fine print. 83 00:05:48,975 --> 00:05:52,058 Here's an example from LinkedIn's terms: 84 00:05:52,138 --> 00:05:56,129 You grant LinkedIn a non-exclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual, 85 00:05:56,199 --> 00:05:59,885 unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable, fully paid up and royalty-free right to us 86 00:05:59,945 --> 00:06:03,415 to copy, prepare derivative works of, improve, distribute, publish, retain... 87 00:06:03,485 --> 00:06:08,104 (talking faster and faster) 88 00:06:11,506 --> 00:06:14,594 So, LinkedIn takes pretty much everything forever. 89 00:06:14,654 --> 00:06:18,228 You find this kind of language in Google, Pinterest, Facebook... 90 00:06:18,278 --> 00:06:21,026 pretty much anything that people consider free. 91 00:06:21,350 --> 00:06:24,307 Instagram is finding that pictures are worth much more 92 00:06:24,337 --> 00:06:26,141 than a thousand angry words, 93 00:06:26,191 --> 00:06:29,335 after the company updated their user agreement to say 94 00:06:29,426 --> 00:06:33,604 it would have the right to sell posted photos without compensation 95 00:06:33,674 --> 00:06:35,796 for use in advertising. 96 00:06:35,846 --> 00:06:37,827 (narrator) And, even if you are paying, 97 00:06:37,877 --> 00:06:39,505 companies have the ability to make you accept 98 00:06:39,535 --> 00:06:41,427 just about whatever they please. 99 00:06:41,477 --> 00:06:45,429 In 2009, Game Station, a company in the UK, 100 00:06:45,739 --> 00:06:47,862 put some pretty sneaky stuff in their terms. 101 00:06:48,271 --> 00:06:50,486 They didn't take money, or your first-born child, 102 00:06:50,856 --> 00:06:52,814 but for one day, their terms stated: 103 00:06:52,844 --> 00:06:54,648 "By placing an order via this website, 104 00:06:54,688 --> 00:06:57,626 you agree to grant us a non-transferable option to claim, 105 00:06:57,646 --> 00:07:00,878 now and for ever more, your immortal soul." 106 00:07:01,384 --> 00:07:03,557 The contract was only alive for a day 107 00:07:03,607 --> 00:07:07,670 but Game Station happen to rake in the lives of 7,000 immortal souls. 108 00:07:07,810 --> 00:07:11,322 This was, of course, a joke, however, it makes you wonder, 109 00:07:11,392 --> 00:07:13,831 what if there were more serious consequences 110 00:07:13,891 --> 00:07:16,220 that might result from not reading terms and conditions? 111 00:07:16,452 --> 00:07:18,938 And what if your phone came with these long terms & conditions saying 112 00:07:18,988 --> 00:07:22,169 if you use the phone the government can wiretap you? That would be insane. 113 00:07:22,209 --> 00:07:24,499 But that's the kind of world we're living in. 114 00:07:24,761 --> 00:07:27,050 (narrator) The world where the government can wiretap you 115 00:07:27,110 --> 00:07:29,314 because of terms and conditions? 116 00:07:29,515 --> 00:07:33,652 If you look at the iPhone User Agreement wiretapping isn't mentioned, 117 00:07:33,832 --> 00:07:37,631 but in AT&T's Privacy Policy, they say that they can use data 118 00:07:37,751 --> 00:07:42,385 to "investigate, prevent or take action regarding illegal activities..." 119 00:07:43,332 --> 00:07:45,600 Prevent? 120 00:07:54,513 --> 00:07:57,930 ♪ Love the stuff we're made of Pizza Hut ♪ 121 00:07:58,223 --> 00:08:01,443 (narrator) In 1994, Pizza Hut became the first major chain 122 00:08:01,473 --> 00:08:03,351 to accept a delivery online. 123 00:08:03,431 --> 00:08:05,642 Suddenly, the Internet needed a way to remember 124 00:08:05,702 --> 00:08:09,114 who you were, where you lived, and how you were going to pay. 125 00:08:09,868 --> 00:08:12,146 My question is, what the hell?! 126 00:08:12,216 --> 00:08:14,204 Like, how do they know who you are? 127 00:08:14,284 --> 00:08:15,346 Yeah. 128 00:08:15,627 --> 00:08:18,541 Ok... there are these things called cookies, 129 00:08:18,921 --> 00:08:21,209 where, like, if you go to a site and buy something, 130 00:08:21,369 --> 00:08:25,128 it'll remember you and then create ads for other stuff you might want to buy. 131 00:08:25,228 --> 00:08:30,057 So, it learns information about me? Seems like an invasion of privacy. 132 00:08:30,658 --> 00:08:32,430 (narrator) It wasn't until the late 90s 133 00:08:32,480 --> 00:08:35,250 that companies began voluntarily adding privacy policies 134 00:08:35,320 --> 00:08:37,946 to explain what was happening with this data. 135 00:08:38,225 --> 00:08:42,146 Then, in 2000, an online company called Toysmart went bankrupt, 136 00:08:42,256 --> 00:08:44,273 but they had an idea: 137 00:08:44,473 --> 00:08:48,463 they tried to sell their database of 195,000 users to another company. 138 00:08:48,874 --> 00:08:53,314 This includes names, billing information, shopping preferences and family profiles, 139 00:08:53,364 --> 00:08:56,634 even though their privacy policy said they would never share information. 140 00:08:56,734 --> 00:08:58,603 People felt like they were being duped. 141 00:08:58,850 --> 00:09:00,695 Lawmakers tell you, time and time again, 142 00:09:00,735 --> 00:09:03,357 that every time they go back to their districts 143 00:09:03,407 --> 00:09:08,530 people are telling them that they want some internet privacy laws, 144 00:09:08,611 --> 00:09:10,768 they want some protection. 145 00:09:10,938 --> 00:09:13,726 [narrator] In early 2001 over a dozen bills 146 00:09:13,846 --> 00:09:16,950 were introduced in Congress to protect privacy online. 147 00:09:18,934 --> 00:09:22,111 (Bush)These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation 148 00:09:22,161 --> 00:09:26,232 into chaos and retreat, But they have failed. 149 00:09:26,603 --> 00:09:29,478 (narrator) All of the privacy legislation was killed or abandoned, 150 00:09:29,538 --> 00:09:31,852 and the Patriot Act was, of course, initiated. 151 00:09:32,113 --> 00:09:33,959 (Bush) The Bill before me takes account 152 00:09:33,979 --> 00:09:37,186 of the new realities and dangers posed by modern terrorists. 153 00:09:37,256 --> 00:09:39,308 This new law that I sign today 154 00:09:39,338 --> 00:09:43,511 will allow surveillance of all communications used by terrorists, 155 00:09:44,341 --> 00:09:47,449 including e-mails, the Internet, and cell phones. 156 00:09:48,049 --> 00:09:52,307 The Patriot Act expanded the ability of the Federal Government 157 00:09:52,447 --> 00:09:55,239 to do surveillance in a lot of little ways. 158 00:09:55,289 --> 00:09:57,286 You don't need a judges' approval, for instance, 159 00:09:57,336 --> 00:10:01,190 to find out what websites someone visited, 160 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:04,351 what search terms they typed into Google. 161 00:10:04,411 --> 00:10:08,743 The question of your... if you will, information being retained by Google, 162 00:10:08,823 --> 00:10:11,255 is not really at this point a Google decision, 163 00:10:11,295 --> 00:10:13,831 it's really a political or public policy decision 164 00:10:13,881 --> 00:10:16,237 enforced by different governments in different ways. 165 00:10:16,623 --> 00:10:19,657 (narrator) What if privacy policies weren't about protecting privacy at all 166 00:10:19,707 --> 00:10:22,603 but rather, taking it away? 167 00:10:23,581 --> 00:10:26,281 Let's take a look at Google's Privacy Policy around this time 168 00:10:26,331 --> 00:10:28,744 to see if any changes were made. 169 00:10:28,864 --> 00:10:32,221 So, here's Google's Privacy Policy from December of 2000: 170 00:10:32,291 --> 00:10:36,189 "Google may also choose to use cookies to store user preferences. 171 00:10:36,760 --> 00:10:38,367 A cookie can tell us, 172 00:10:38,407 --> 00:10:40,881 'This is the same computer that visited Google two days ago', 173 00:10:40,961 --> 00:10:43,488 but it cannot tell us, 'This person is Joe Smith', 174 00:10:43,538 --> 00:10:46,259 or even, 'This person lives in the United States'." 175 00:10:46,850 --> 00:10:51,121 And here is the Privacy Policy from one year later, in December of 2001: 176 00:10:51,451 --> 00:10:53,983 "Google does this by storing user preferences and cookies, 177 00:10:54,052 --> 00:10:57,295 and by tracking user trends and patterns of how people search. 178 00:10:57,345 --> 00:11:00,044 Google will not disclose cookies to third parties, 179 00:11:00,104 --> 00:11:02,608 except as required by a valid legal process, 180 00:11:02,648 --> 00:11:06,149 such as a search warrant, subpoena, statute or court order." 181 00:11:06,209 --> 00:11:08,906 Now, it's important to know the fundamental difference 182 00:11:08,936 --> 00:11:10,851 between these two policies. 183 00:11:10,891 --> 00:11:12,779 One says that you're totally anonymous, 184 00:11:12,839 --> 00:11:16,338 the other says, when necessary, you're not. 185 00:11:16,388 --> 00:11:18,442 But here's what's strange: 186 00:11:18,522 --> 00:11:20,916 So, the first screen shot you saw of Google's oldest policy 187 00:11:20,986 --> 00:11:23,467 was taken by a non-profit Internet archival service 188 00:11:23,547 --> 00:11:27,289 that records what websites used to look like by taking snapshots, 189 00:11:27,359 --> 00:11:29,779 and it's been doing it since the 90s. 190 00:11:29,849 --> 00:11:32,810 Now, Google also lists the history of its privacy policies 191 00:11:32,870 --> 00:11:34,990 on its own official archive page. 192 00:11:35,039 --> 00:11:37,387 In their archive, they said they got every privacy policy 193 00:11:37,417 --> 00:11:39,144 that goes back to the beginning, 194 00:11:39,174 --> 00:11:41,881 but what Google shows as their original privacy policies, 195 00:11:41,911 --> 00:11:44,132 doesn't match that of the archive service. 196 00:11:44,202 --> 00:11:47,680 Instead, they show their policy from December of 2001, 197 00:11:47,731 --> 00:11:50,294 the one that says that users are not anonymous. 198 00:11:50,314 --> 00:11:53,992 Google claims this is their first privacy policy, which it isn't. 199 00:11:54,121 --> 00:11:57,331 So, why would Google not include its original privacy policy 200 00:11:57,391 --> 00:11:59,296 on its own archives page? 201 00:11:59,316 --> 00:12:01,404 The one that said you would remain anonymous. 202 00:12:01,474 --> 00:12:03,666 What if the data collection that the Patriot Act required 203 00:12:03,727 --> 00:12:06,717 became the foundation of a whole new business model, 204 00:12:06,768 --> 00:12:09,614 and the foundation of the modern Internet as we know it? 205 00:12:09,835 --> 00:12:11,816 Would that be something worth covering up? 206 00:12:12,123 --> 00:12:13,929 Well, even though we don't write checks to Google, 207 00:12:14,018 --> 00:12:16,578 and that's one of the reasons we kind of like the company, 208 00:12:16,628 --> 00:12:19,469 it doesn't mean that Google is really free, 209 00:12:19,740 --> 00:12:23,613 or that we are free in the liberty sense when we use it. 210 00:12:23,954 --> 00:12:29,628 It might feel different if Google was effectively a $500 a year service, 211 00:12:29,779 --> 00:12:31,444 because that's the amount of... 212 00:12:31,524 --> 00:12:33,770 that's the value of the data that you're providing. 213 00:12:33,850 --> 00:12:38,699 I mean, that was a really critical find in that advertising could be targeted 214 00:12:38,820 --> 00:12:43,234 based on information that people were somehow supplying about themselves. 215 00:12:43,284 --> 00:12:47,728 Suddenly, you didn't have to wonder, "Was somebody watching my commercial?" 216 00:12:47,919 --> 00:12:53,377 You knew if someone click on my ad that meant that they paid attention to it. 217 00:12:53,619 --> 00:12:57,393 (narrator) In 2012, Google was one of the most valuable stocks in the world, 218 00:12:57,533 --> 00:12:59,407 and Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, 219 00:12:59,483 --> 00:13:01,768 had become one of the richest men in America. 220 00:13:02,155 --> 00:13:06,352 My job is to help investors figure out for themselves what this thing's worth. 221 00:13:06,422 --> 00:13:08,924 I look at what Facebook has as an asset, 222 00:13:09,033 --> 00:13:13,760 which is 900 million people, and a ton of data on those people. 223 00:13:13,811 --> 00:13:17,085 And I say, if they use 10% of that data 224 00:13:17,125 --> 00:13:19,379 they're gonna be the most valuable company ever. 225 00:13:19,595 --> 00:13:21,676 (narrator) When personal data is worth this much, 226 00:13:21,706 --> 00:13:24,241 why would Google, or any free internet service, 227 00:13:24,291 --> 00:13:27,070 be opposed to the data retention that the Patriot Act required. 228 00:13:27,120 --> 00:13:29,581 Anonymity wasn't profitable. 229 00:13:29,936 --> 00:13:33,698 The people say, who are willing to... give up a little bit of information 230 00:13:33,768 --> 00:13:36,717 in exchange for having access to something that's free, 231 00:13:36,777 --> 00:13:40,286 or something that's fun, or a free taco. (laughter) 232 00:13:40,386 --> 00:13:43,509 I don't think that ever changes, right? You always want something free, 233 00:13:43,689 --> 00:13:47,746 and plenty of people are willing to provide information to get that. 234 00:13:48,100 --> 00:13:51,150 (narrator) And plenty of companies picked up on this fact. 235 00:13:59,110 --> 00:14:03,619 Let me give you some very practical tips (laughter) 236 00:14:03,990 --> 00:14:07,667 First of all, I want everyone here to be careful about 237 00:14:07,697 --> 00:14:10,578 what you post of Facebook. (laughter) 238 00:14:10,964 --> 00:14:12,943 What the default settings are on Facebook... 239 00:14:12,993 --> 00:14:15,816 this is how most people use this technology. 240 00:14:15,867 --> 00:14:20,262 When these companies are building these systems they know that. 241 00:14:20,792 --> 00:14:26,027 (interviewer) "So, why is it the default for everything sharing, every photo, 242 00:14:26,067 --> 00:14:27,913 when I start Facebook? 243 00:14:27,963 --> 00:14:30,198 Why isn't it just for my friends? 244 00:14:30,258 --> 00:14:32,159 Why is the default for everybody? 245 00:14:32,209 --> 00:14:34,211 Because it's really confusing for my mom to figure out 246 00:14:34,241 --> 00:14:36,234 how to just share to her friends." 247 00:14:36,304 --> 00:14:39,430 The way we've designed the site is that is a community thing, 248 00:14:39,470 --> 00:14:42,112 where some people want to share with just their friends, 249 00:14:42,152 --> 00:14:43,770 but a lot of people also want to share 250 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:46,127 - with the community now-- - Right, right. 251 00:14:46,167 --> 00:14:48,482 I want to share with everyone who works with me at Facebook, 252 00:14:48,522 --> 00:14:50,531 I want to share with everyone who went to my college, 253 00:14:50,581 --> 00:14:53,168 everyone in the village around me. 254 00:14:53,248 --> 00:14:55,214 And those people aren't just my friends. 255 00:14:55,274 --> 00:14:57,886 (narrator) Even Mark's explanation doesn't make any sense. 256 00:14:57,947 --> 00:14:59,730 He says he wants to share with the school, 257 00:14:59,770 --> 00:15:01,199 with the quaint village next to him, 258 00:15:01,249 --> 00:15:03,641 he doesn't say he want to share with the entire world 259 00:15:03,671 --> 00:15:05,878 and yet, that's the default. 260 00:15:06,125 --> 00:15:08,666 The challenge with default is that you get comfortable 261 00:15:08,706 --> 00:15:10,793 with whatever the default is. 262 00:15:10,924 --> 00:15:12,908 When the default is public, 263 00:15:12,949 --> 00:15:15,680 you're actually going to adapt really beautifully and deal with it. 264 00:15:15,730 --> 00:15:17,647 When the default is private, 265 00:15:17,697 --> 00:15:19,862 you can adapt comfortably and deal with it. 266 00:15:20,152 --> 00:15:23,301 When the defaults change, that's when problems emerge. 267 00:15:23,740 --> 00:15:26,112 (narrator) And in fact, that's what Facebook did. 268 00:15:26,152 --> 00:15:30,304 In 2009, Facebook made changes to their privacy policy without telling anyone. 269 00:15:30,751 --> 00:15:33,587 - Doing a privacy change for 350 million users-- - Yeah-- 270 00:15:33,687 --> 00:15:37,200 it's a really, you know, it's, it's... not the type of thing 271 00:15:37,290 --> 00:15:39,147 that a lot of companies would do, you know... 272 00:15:39,207 --> 00:15:41,146 We've decided that these would be the social norms now, 273 00:15:41,186 --> 00:15:43,103 and we just went for it. 274 00:15:43,273 --> 00:15:45,596 (narrator) You might remember the fan page with over a million people 275 00:15:45,636 --> 00:15:47,658 who tried to get the policy reversed. 276 00:15:47,688 --> 00:15:49,651 What was the big deal, you might ask...? 277 00:15:49,701 --> 00:15:51,539 Well, over the course of a night 278 00:15:51,599 --> 00:15:53,812 Facebook turned what was once private information 279 00:15:54,022 --> 00:15:56,375 into totally public information. 280 00:16:02,495 --> 00:16:06,489 These platforms have an incentive to keep as much information about you 281 00:16:06,639 --> 00:16:09,190 and make it as visible as possible. 282 00:16:12,451 --> 00:16:16,781 It's almost the question then becomes what's the less forgivable sin, 283 00:16:17,181 --> 00:16:19,470 having this crazy one night stand, 284 00:16:19,590 --> 00:16:22,001 or not knowing how to use Facebook properly. 285 00:16:33,128 --> 00:16:35,506 Most relationships in your life, 286 00:16:35,576 --> 00:16:39,658 it's very good that the other person doesn't know everything 287 00:16:39,718 --> 00:16:45,126 you've ever said, or scribbled, or thought. 288 00:16:52,526 --> 00:16:55,267 When you choose to share a photo album 289 00:16:55,317 --> 00:16:58,761 you go to Facebook and you choose to put those photos there. 290 00:17:02,481 --> 00:17:05,256 How do I opt in on every single thing? 291 00:17:05,526 --> 00:17:06,939 Opt in. 292 00:17:08,595 --> 00:17:10,000 Opt in. 293 00:17:10,892 --> 00:17:12,131 Opt in. 294 00:17:16,238 --> 00:17:18,967 I'm OK with Facebook behaving like a company, 295 00:17:19,067 --> 00:17:22,396 but I think we need to treat it like a company 296 00:17:22,536 --> 00:17:25,475 and not treat it like some benign public utility. 297 00:17:26,622 --> 00:17:29,215 [narrator] These are the default settings on Facebook in 2005 298 00:17:29,265 --> 00:17:31,275 divided into 12 categories. 299 00:17:31,425 --> 00:17:34,565 As time passes, more and more information is shared by default. 300 00:17:34,645 --> 00:17:38,053 In 2009, Facebook began automatically sharing personal information 301 00:17:38,124 --> 00:17:39,976 with the entire Internet. 302 00:17:40,066 --> 00:17:42,649 By 2010, everything was shared by default, 303 00:17:42,689 --> 00:17:45,122 except for your contact info and your birthday. 304 00:17:45,216 --> 00:17:50,383 We could if you did a search in Gmail, in YouTube, and so forth, yesterday, 305 00:17:50,823 --> 00:17:53,563 and you did it from your home... I'll give you the worst case: 306 00:17:53,603 --> 00:17:56,216 You did it from your home and you only have one computer in your home. 307 00:17:56,566 --> 00:18:00,181 In theory, we can cross-correlate those and get all three together. 308 00:18:00,931 --> 00:18:03,341 But we don't do that and we're not likely to do that. 309 00:18:03,649 --> 00:18:07,355 (narrator) But in January 2012, Google made changes to their privacy policy 310 00:18:07,405 --> 00:18:09,262 and they did just that. 311 00:18:09,302 --> 00:18:11,708 Google combined all of the information 312 00:18:11,738 --> 00:18:14,220 any of their services have collected about a person, 313 00:18:14,290 --> 00:18:17,117 and put it into one single profile. 314 00:18:17,157 --> 00:18:20,112 What Eric Schmidt had said was the worst case scenario, 315 00:18:20,252 --> 00:18:22,469 Google had actually done. 316 00:18:29,740 --> 00:18:33,540 How can you honestly sit here and tell this committee 317 00:18:33,650 --> 00:18:36,147 this is not a growing problem? 318 00:18:36,557 --> 00:18:38,438 A good deal of what I was trying to say 319 00:18:38,468 --> 00:18:42,247 is that I don't think there is evidence of a market failure or consumer harm 320 00:18:42,497 --> 00:18:49,141 from the legal and legitimate use of personal information in commerce. 321 00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,896 I don't think there's evidence of it. 322 00:18:53,327 --> 00:18:55,724 There are companies that we've never heard of like Acxiom, 323 00:18:55,994 --> 00:18:59,495 that claims to have about 1,500 points of data on the average American citizen, 324 00:18:59,595 --> 00:19:02,888 everything from, whether you're right-handed or left-handed, 325 00:19:02,958 --> 00:19:04,921 what kind of dog you have, 326 00:19:04,961 --> 00:19:06,963 what your sort of psychological outlook is, 327 00:19:06,983 --> 00:19:10,031 and all of that can be used to inform decisions 328 00:19:10,071 --> 00:19:12,864 that businesses make about us as well. 329 00:19:13,048 --> 00:19:16,551 These are the types of companies that a potential employer would go to 330 00:19:16,601 --> 00:19:19,723 to try to run a background check on somebody before they hire them. 331 00:19:19,813 --> 00:19:24,072 They're able to connect the fact that you went to site A, 332 00:19:24,102 --> 00:19:27,136 and then later B, and eventually to site C, 333 00:19:27,207 --> 00:19:30,422 and create this detailed history of what sites you visit online. 334 00:19:31,037 --> 00:19:33,114 They don't put your name in the cookie, 335 00:19:33,285 --> 00:19:35,236 they put a unique serial number in the cookie, 336 00:19:35,276 --> 00:19:38,064 that could then be linked to your name in their database. 337 00:19:38,512 --> 00:19:41,314 I don't know if you've ever seen the picture 338 00:19:41,374 --> 00:19:44,517 of the ad network ecosystem that shows all the parties 339 00:19:44,577 --> 00:19:48,734 in the ad network ecosystem; it's a bit overwhelming. 340 00:19:49,544 --> 00:19:52,079 The information is valuable to different people for different reasons. 341 00:19:52,670 --> 00:19:55,182 What if you buy a lot of alcohol? 342 00:19:55,223 --> 00:19:56,979 Well, they might want to raise your premiums 343 00:19:57,038 --> 00:19:59,971 because they think you are at risk for alcoholism, or something like that. 344 00:20:00,020 --> 00:20:04,844 The company might use it in a way that actually harms you. 345 00:20:05,106 --> 00:20:07,912 (narrator) For example, in 2008 thousands of people 346 00:20:07,952 --> 00:20:10,038 suddenly had their credit limits reduced, 347 00:20:10,078 --> 00:20:11,939 seemingly for no reason. 348 00:20:11,979 --> 00:20:14,219 While on vacation, one wealthy business owner from Atlanta, 349 00:20:14,339 --> 00:20:17,878 saw his limit plummet from $10,800 to just $3,800 350 00:20:17,898 --> 00:20:19,946 ruining his vacation. 351 00:20:20,015 --> 00:20:22,075 The letter he received said this: 352 00:20:22,135 --> 00:20:24,198 "Other customers who've used their card at establishments 353 00:20:24,239 --> 00:20:26,292 where you recently shopped 354 00:20:26,342 --> 00:20:28,407 had a poor repayment history with American Express." 355 00:20:28,447 --> 00:20:30,863 This means companies like Wal-Mart. 356 00:20:30,923 --> 00:20:32,530 And in Minneapolis, 357 00:20:32,570 --> 00:20:34,449 a father came into a Target outraged 358 00:20:34,469 --> 00:20:37,161 that they were sending his teenage daughter pregnancy coupons, 359 00:20:37,191 --> 00:20:39,605 coupons that were addressed to her. 360 00:20:39,655 --> 00:20:43,136 The man thought that Target was trying to encourage his daughter to get pregnant. 361 00:20:43,176 --> 00:20:46,179 As it turned out, thanks to her shopping habits, 362 00:20:46,310 --> 00:20:50,081 Target knew that this high-schooler was pregnant before her own father did. 363 00:20:50,642 --> 00:20:53,137 The father later apologized. 364 00:20:53,615 --> 00:20:55,912 And in The Netherlands, data were being used to harm customers 365 00:20:55,952 --> 00:20:57,718 in a whole new way. 366 00:20:57,818 --> 00:21:00,093 Now, while you're driving and using a GPS, 367 00:21:00,143 --> 00:21:03,191 that GPS is sending back signals that tell how fast you're moving. 368 00:21:03,262 --> 00:21:06,078 It's really useful for helping us to avoid traffic, 369 00:21:06,108 --> 00:21:08,754 but that kind of little company called Tom Tom was wondering 370 00:21:08,874 --> 00:21:11,479 who else might be interested in knowing the speed of traffic. 371 00:21:11,539 --> 00:21:12,958 And so, in The Netherlands, 372 00:21:12,978 --> 00:21:14,397 the data that people were willingly trading 373 00:21:14,437 --> 00:21:16,085 to find a faster way home, 374 00:21:16,135 --> 00:21:18,885 was being sold to the authorities to give those same drivers tickets. 375 00:21:26,571 --> 00:21:30,295 Is the reason we don't have any baseline consumer privacy law 376 00:21:30,625 --> 00:21:32,608 because of the FBI? No. 377 00:21:33,147 --> 00:21:35,438 That is largely due to lobbying by companies 378 00:21:35,658 --> 00:21:38,253 that have built extremely lucrative businesses 379 00:21:38,334 --> 00:21:40,610 around these business activities, 380 00:21:40,700 --> 00:21:43,107 and don't want to do anything to disrupt that. 381 00:21:44,103 --> 00:21:49,186 Under Facebook's terms and conditions a user must be 13 or older. 382 00:21:49,747 --> 00:21:53,890 Despite this, according to recent consumers' report study, 383 00:21:53,970 --> 00:21:57,658 an estimated 7.5 million users were younger than 13. 384 00:21:58,333 --> 00:22:02,548 First of all, we don't allow people to have an account under the age of 13. 385 00:22:02,918 --> 00:22:05,672 And my reaction to that is that that's just absolutely indefensible, 386 00:22:05,732 --> 00:22:08,275 it's unbelievable that you would say that. 387 00:22:08,853 --> 00:22:11,649 Senator, I just want to say we really emphatically agree with your points. 388 00:22:11,957 --> 00:22:14,587 They say that Facebook sent an army of lawyers 389 00:22:14,647 --> 00:22:18,582 so that the final privacy legislation that emerged in 2011 390 00:22:18,842 --> 00:22:20,800 was watered down significantly 391 00:22:20,850 --> 00:22:23,214 in a way that wouldn't affect Facebook business model. 392 00:22:23,710 --> 00:22:26,463 My name is Alan Davidson and I'm the Director of Public Policy 393 00:22:26,533 --> 00:22:28,735 for Google in North and South America. 394 00:22:28,935 --> 00:22:30,819 My message today is simple: 395 00:22:30,959 --> 00:22:34,911 As we've heard, mobile services create enormous social and economic benefits. 396 00:22:35,326 --> 00:22:38,043 I reject the notion that privacy protection 397 00:22:38,093 --> 00:22:40,651 is the enemy of innovation. 398 00:22:40,861 --> 00:22:43,629 It absolutely doesn't have to be, and isn't. 399 00:22:44,167 --> 00:22:46,971 (narrator) It was an expensive year of lobbying for these big companies. 400 00:22:47,110 --> 00:22:49,679 Google spent five times as much as the year before. 401 00:22:49,979 --> 00:22:52,000 And Facebook spent four times as much. 402 00:22:52,472 --> 00:22:56,921 The Senate Bill 242 will protect users of social networking Internet sites. 403 00:22:57,220 --> 00:23:02,534 It will protect these users from identity theft and unwanted contact 404 00:23:02,624 --> 00:23:05,310 by keeping their private information private, 405 00:23:05,380 --> 00:23:08,035 of course, unless they agree to share it. 406 00:23:08,313 --> 00:23:10,797 I know that many members, including myself, 407 00:23:10,867 --> 00:23:14,463 do not want to negatively impact a very important industry 408 00:23:14,533 --> 00:23:16,737 for the State of California. 409 00:23:16,937 --> 00:23:19,572 Individuals involved in this industry don't want to see 410 00:23:19,612 --> 00:23:22,186 any regulation whatsoever, 411 00:23:22,286 --> 00:23:24,514 so I think that's really the key. 412 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:28,227 And one of the most interesting things I've found in these conversations 413 00:23:28,357 --> 00:23:34,338 is that many members of the legislature don't even have social network sites 414 00:23:34,408 --> 00:23:37,261 because they're concerned about about their privacy. 415 00:23:37,465 --> 00:23:39,634 At the time the Bill was being heard, 416 00:23:39,674 --> 00:23:41,822 all the lobbyist were in the committee room 417 00:23:41,892 --> 00:23:43,900 for the entire hearing. 418 00:23:44,109 --> 00:23:46,248 They did not come forward to speak. 419 00:23:46,328 --> 00:23:48,695 So, sort of an interesting process, 420 00:23:48,755 --> 00:23:50,981 sort of a stealth killing of the Bill, 421 00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:55,412 without the opportunity for the public to really see who was in opposition. 422 00:23:55,753 --> 00:23:58,503 So, people like Google and Facebook were in strong opposition 423 00:23:59,122 --> 00:24:01,094 Facebook in particular. 424 00:24:01,610 --> 00:24:03,336 (interviewer) "What did Facebook have to lose?" 425 00:24:03,977 --> 00:24:09,420 You know, I really do not understand their logic, 426 00:24:09,531 --> 00:24:11,938 and you'd have to ask them about that, 427 00:24:12,007 --> 00:24:16,161 - but when I analyze an issue like this -- - I'd love to ask them about that, 428 00:24:16,241 --> 00:24:18,106 they won't talk to me, so... 429 00:24:18,166 --> 00:24:20,360 I'm not surprised. (laughter) 430 00:24:20,678 --> 00:24:24,203 I don't think the rules of law and regulation 431 00:24:24,293 --> 00:24:29,137 necessarily apply when it comes to, you know, interacting with a company 432 00:24:29,247 --> 00:24:31,574 that wants to sell you something. 433 00:24:31,898 --> 00:24:34,336 Yeah. We should be worried. 434 00:24:35,507 --> 00:24:37,939 (narrator) But worried... about what? 435 00:24:38,328 --> 00:24:41,455 Sure the data collection allowed by privacy policies has fooled Congress 436 00:24:41,576 --> 00:24:44,820 But was there something more serious we were agreeing to? 437 00:24:55,717 --> 00:24:58,566 (narrator) Total Information Awareness. 438 00:24:58,776 --> 00:25:02,124 A program initiated by the government in January of 2002. 439 00:25:02,645 --> 00:25:06,693 Its mission: to collect every digital transmission imaginable. 440 00:25:07,142 --> 00:25:09,838 And yes, this was their real symbol, 441 00:25:09,918 --> 00:25:12,774 the eye on the pyramid scanning the Earth with the laser beam. 442 00:25:13,373 --> 00:25:16,280 It actually looks oddly similar to what's inside Mark Zuckerberg's hoodie. 443 00:25:16,433 --> 00:25:18,291 (Zuckerberg) Making the world more openly connected. 444 00:25:18,415 --> 00:25:21,729 Oh, my God! It's like a secret cult. (laughter) 445 00:25:22,159 --> 00:25:25,856 Total Information Awareness was a program designed to connect the dots, 446 00:25:25,926 --> 00:25:31,501 to link banking activities to flight searches, to online activities-- 447 00:25:31,949 --> 00:25:37,075 (TV) But the Pentagon is clearly moving to create the largest electronic eye ever 448 00:25:37,295 --> 00:25:39,723 to look at any and all Americans. 449 00:25:40,092 --> 00:25:43,976 You're looking for trends and transactions that are associated 450 00:25:44,085 --> 00:25:47,100 with some potential terrorist act. 451 00:25:47,393 --> 00:25:51,667 They believe that with enough data they can predict who would be engaging 452 00:25:51,797 --> 00:25:53,907 in nefarious crimes. 453 00:25:54,001 --> 00:25:56,452 (narrator) The public was outraged, Congress was outraged, 454 00:25:56,552 --> 00:25:58,424 the program was shut down. 455 00:25:58,579 --> 00:26:00,933 The lesson that the government learned 456 00:26:00,983 --> 00:26:03,727 after the failure of the Total Information Awareness, 457 00:26:03,767 --> 00:26:07,619 was that if you're going to create a gigantic spying program, 458 00:26:08,128 --> 00:26:09,848 don't give it a creepy name. 459 00:26:10,024 --> 00:26:13,407 There's nothing to prevent them from developing the same capabilities 460 00:26:13,688 --> 00:26:16,298 just in smarter ways from their standpoint. 461 00:26:22,204 --> 00:26:27,500 A wiretap requires a court order, nothing has changed, by the way. 462 00:26:28,033 --> 00:26:30,904 (narrator) But, in reality, lots had changed. 463 00:26:31,227 --> 00:26:33,969 How we were told one day in late 2002, 464 00:26:34,058 --> 00:26:37,731 that an NSA representative was coming to the office... 465 00:26:38,217 --> 00:26:41,395 Mark Klein came to us, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 466 00:26:41,525 --> 00:26:47,018 with data and documents that show that AT&T was engaged 467 00:26:47,188 --> 00:26:49,310 in a wiretapping program. 468 00:26:49,434 --> 00:26:52,433 The NSA is much different from the CIA. 469 00:26:52,583 --> 00:26:56,433 First of all, it's about three times the size, it costs far more, 470 00:26:58,724 --> 00:27:02,178 it's tremendously more secret than the CIA, 471 00:27:02,378 --> 00:27:05,092 and what it does, it's very different. 472 00:27:05,202 --> 00:27:10,026 It's focused on eavesdropping, on tapping into major communication links. 473 00:27:10,626 --> 00:27:13,314 It actually had a secret room in their facilities, 474 00:27:13,374 --> 00:27:15,760 and they were creating a copy of Internet traffic 475 00:27:15,860 --> 00:27:17,795 and sending it to the NSA. 476 00:27:18,344 --> 00:27:20,831 So, in a sense, they're vacuuming up, scooping up... 477 00:27:21,061 --> 00:27:25,559 Everything is blatantly vacuuming up, everything's going across those links. 478 00:27:25,645 --> 00:27:27,864 - And you're certain of that? - I'm certain of that. 479 00:27:27,988 --> 00:27:30,267 (narrator) So President Bush owned up to it. 480 00:27:31,242 --> 00:27:33,769 I authorized the National Security Agency 481 00:27:34,238 --> 00:27:37,909 to intercept the international communications of people 482 00:27:37,989 --> 00:27:40,856 with known links to Al-Qaeda, 483 00:27:40,946 --> 00:27:43,655 and related terrorist organizations. 484 00:27:44,523 --> 00:27:47,346 It's taken less than 24 hours after the Bush presidency ended 485 00:27:47,416 --> 00:27:51,088 for a former analyst of the NSA to come forward to reveal new allegations 486 00:27:51,158 --> 00:27:54,318 about how this nation was spied on by its own government. 487 00:27:54,828 --> 00:27:58,428 The National Security Agency has access to all Americans' communications 488 00:27:58,578 --> 00:28:03,708 -- faxes, phone calls, and their computer communications. 489 00:28:04,420 --> 00:28:06,932 So, there's a recording somewhere of every conversation 490 00:28:07,001 --> 00:28:10,567 I had with my little nephew in upstate New York? Is it like that? 491 00:28:10,660 --> 00:28:12,686 It would be everything, yes. 492 00:28:13,416 --> 00:28:15,278 It would be everything. 493 00:28:16,413 --> 00:28:19,125 (narrator) But, then a beacon of hope arrived in the White House. 494 00:28:19,786 --> 00:28:22,302 Hi Senator Obama, I appreciate you giving us the opportunity 495 00:28:22,362 --> 00:28:24,059 to ask you questions. 496 00:28:24,099 --> 00:28:27,148 I'm an attorney who represents federal whistle-blowers, 497 00:28:27,518 --> 00:28:32,329 and I was very disappointed when I learned that you supported the Bill 498 00:28:32,409 --> 00:28:35,658 that lets phone companies off the hook 499 00:28:35,708 --> 00:28:41,961 when they've helped the Federal Government without warrant-- 500 00:28:42,841 --> 00:28:45,592 wiretap phones. (applause) 501 00:28:45,722 --> 00:28:47,364 I recognize that some people feel like, 502 00:28:47,424 --> 00:28:50,523 yeah, well, the phone companies still were complicit in this, 503 00:28:50,573 --> 00:28:53,786 they should be held accountable still -- I understand that argument. 504 00:28:53,836 --> 00:28:55,879 But the problem was the surveillance program 505 00:28:55,879 --> 00:28:58,879 is actually one that I believe is necessary for our national security. 506 00:28:59,140 --> 00:29:00,792 (interviewer) "So they were immune, 507 00:29:00,792 --> 00:29:03,782 but that means that the programs were still shut down, right?" 508 00:29:04,228 --> 00:29:06,581 The programs are shut down? 509 00:29:06,661 --> 00:29:08,769 (interviewer) "Yeah, the wiretapping program." 510 00:29:08,883 --> 00:29:11,184 I have no reason to believe that the wiretapping programs 511 00:29:11,204 --> 00:29:12,624 have been shut down. 512 00:29:12,664 --> 00:29:15,928 No, if the wiretapping programs had been shut down, 513 00:29:15,988 --> 00:29:21,209 then I don't believe that the government and AT&T would still be fighting in court 514 00:29:21,269 --> 00:29:23,050 for the legality of it. 515 00:29:23,987 --> 00:29:26,819 (interviewer) "So, Barack Obama hasn't changed anything?" 516 00:29:26,943 --> 00:29:30,949 No, Barack Obama did not shut those programs down after he took office, 517 00:29:31,018 --> 00:29:34,666 even though, he had threatened to before he became president. 518 00:29:41,899 --> 00:29:44,639 When we got started in my dorm room at Harvard, 519 00:29:45,790 --> 00:29:47,495 the question that a lot of people asked was, 520 00:29:47,555 --> 00:29:50,865 why would I want to put any information on the Internet at all, 521 00:29:50,905 --> 00:29:52,613 why would I want to have a website. 522 00:29:52,643 --> 00:29:54,463 And people have really gotten comfortable, 523 00:29:54,503 --> 00:29:56,781 not only sharing more information and different kinds, 524 00:29:56,932 --> 00:29:58,916 but more openly and with more people. 525 00:29:58,966 --> 00:30:01,617 And that social norm is just something that's evolved over time. 526 00:30:02,244 --> 00:30:05,174 You may have seen the Onion take on Facebook, 527 00:30:05,624 --> 00:30:11,506 which was the CIA has just announced its most recent handy convention: Facebook 528 00:30:12,266 --> 00:30:14,590 (anchorwoman) According to Department of Homeland Security reports, 529 00:30:14,630 --> 00:30:17,844 Facebook has replaced almost every other CIA information gathering program 530 00:30:17,884 --> 00:30:20,243 since it was launched in 2004. 531 00:30:21,239 --> 00:30:23,250 After years of secretly monitoring the public, 532 00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:26,481 we were astounded so many people would willingly publicize 533 00:30:26,521 --> 00:30:29,127 where they lived, their religious and political views, 534 00:30:29,247 --> 00:30:31,556 an alphabetized list of all their friends, 535 00:30:31,586 --> 00:30:33,876 personal e-mail addresses, phone numbers, 536 00:30:33,926 --> 00:30:36,204 hundred of photos of themselves, 537 00:30:36,264 --> 00:30:39,375 and even status updates about what they were doing moment to moment. 538 00:30:39,425 --> 00:30:42,414 It is truly a dream come true for the CIA 539 00:30:42,630 --> 00:30:45,673 You know, the FBIs and the NSAs of the world 540 00:30:45,844 --> 00:30:49,761 are appreciative of the fact that Google and Facebook, you know, 541 00:30:49,801 --> 00:30:52,287 had built business models around collecting user's data, 542 00:30:52,347 --> 00:30:54,553 because it makes their jobs much easier. 543 00:30:54,607 --> 00:30:57,486 There's an article in the Times that started with this anecdote: 544 00:30:57,506 --> 00:30:59,919 They're sitting in their transparent cubicle 545 00:30:59,989 --> 00:31:02,430 in their open space in Facebook. 546 00:31:02,901 --> 00:31:07,783 Robert Mueller was the one man in the room with a tie on, and he was older in a suit, 547 00:31:07,874 --> 00:31:10,520 and he comes in and says: "I was just in the building 548 00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:12,599 and I wanted to say hello to Mark Zuckerberg." 549 00:31:12,639 --> 00:31:16,746 So, he says hello to Mark Zuckerberg, a little chit chat and then, he leaves. 550 00:31:16,796 --> 00:31:19,194 And everyone was saying: "What the hell was that?". 551 00:31:19,234 --> 00:31:24,964 Now, nobody asked the question: "Why was Mueller in the building?". 552 00:31:25,033 --> 00:31:27,630 He's the head of the FBI. 553 00:31:28,996 --> 00:31:32,478 So, in the one hand, Mark Zuckerberg has said he wants to create 554 00:31:32,518 --> 00:31:34,261 a more open society 555 00:31:34,301 --> 00:31:36,907 and Facebook is a way to do that. 556 00:31:36,957 --> 00:31:39,759 And, on the other hand, you know, 557 00:31:39,789 --> 00:31:42,013 there's a lot about the way Facebook uses information 558 00:31:42,083 --> 00:31:44,317 that people don't know. 559 00:31:44,548 --> 00:31:46,875 (narrator) If only there's a way of knowing how much information 560 00:31:46,906 --> 00:31:49,048 these companies are storing about us. 561 00:31:49,098 --> 00:31:52,708 Well, in the case of Facebook, we learned some pretty interesting things 562 00:31:52,768 --> 00:31:54,819 thanks to one student in Austria. 563 00:31:54,869 --> 00:31:58,540 And, unlike the US, Europe has a law that requires a company to tell a customer 564 00:31:58,540 --> 00:32:02,066 what data they have stored on them, if that customer wants to know. 565 00:32:02,126 --> 00:32:04,846 And Facebook, unlike most major Internet companies, 566 00:32:04,906 --> 00:32:06,947 had actually built a headquarters in Europe. 567 00:32:07,795 --> 00:32:11,028 Apparently we're like the only 3 people that were like, pushing hard enough, 568 00:32:11,488 --> 00:32:13,619 and like asking again, again and again, 569 00:32:13,689 --> 00:32:16,498 and going through also the Irish authorities to finally get 570 00:32:16,608 --> 00:32:21,168 at least a bigger part of our data set, we still didn't get everything right now. 571 00:32:21,878 --> 00:32:25,936 Got it right there. Just to have an idea of how much it is. (laughter) 572 00:32:26,545 --> 00:32:28,828 - That's like... just to picture it -- - Can I hold it? 573 00:32:28,998 --> 00:32:30,599 and to see how much it is. 574 00:32:30,819 --> 00:32:32,596 Wow, this is more than a baby. 575 00:32:32,646 --> 00:32:35,384 Yeah, that's 1,222 pages. 576 00:32:35,965 --> 00:32:38,013 I'm a member of Facebook for 3 years 577 00:32:38,063 --> 00:32:41,331 but I was using it more intensely like, for the last 1.5 year or so. 578 00:32:41,671 --> 00:32:44,453 What's interesting is, well, that I didn't post too much, actually. 579 00:32:44,543 --> 00:32:47,160 Like, I'm a person that posts something like once a week or so. 580 00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:49,493 With this giant ream of information in front of me, 581 00:32:49,553 --> 00:32:53,314 is it hard to go through and actually find specific details about a person? 582 00:32:53,484 --> 00:32:55,275 No, that's super easy because... 583 00:32:55,325 --> 00:32:58,403 I mean, we just use the search function of the PDF files. 584 00:32:58,543 --> 00:33:00,401 So, you just type in one word, let's say, 585 00:33:00,461 --> 00:33:03,189 "demonstration", or "sex", or "political party", or something... 586 00:33:03,249 --> 00:33:04,614 - Yeah. - and within a second 587 00:33:04,714 --> 00:33:06,539 you find the right information. 588 00:33:06,569 --> 00:33:08,785 So, within a couple of minutes you can figure out what people voted for, 589 00:33:08,845 --> 00:33:13,124 what psychological problems they have, what parties they've been to... 590 00:33:13,974 --> 00:33:16,892 all these information are like really easy to find actually. 591 00:33:17,522 --> 00:33:19,340 While using that service for such a short time, 592 00:33:19,650 --> 00:33:21,891 you still have a data file that's bigger than anything 593 00:33:21,941 --> 00:33:26,657 that any CIA, FBI, or... I don't know, Stasi ever had about an average person. 594 00:33:27,147 --> 00:33:30,372 If you hit the remove button, it just means that it's flagged, deleted. 595 00:33:30,742 --> 00:33:33,928 So, you hide it actually from yourself, but anyone 596 00:33:33,988 --> 00:33:37,870 like Facebook or any government agency that wants to look at it later, 597 00:33:37,940 --> 00:33:40,222 can still retrieve it and get it back. 598 00:33:40,272 --> 00:33:43,055 And that being said, it's there for indefinite time, 599 00:33:44,035 --> 00:33:45,789 even though you hit the delete button 600 00:33:45,829 --> 00:33:48,130 and they asked you three times if you really, really want to delete it. 601 00:33:48,238 --> 00:33:50,110 (interviewer) "It's not actually gone?" 602 00:33:50,214 --> 00:33:52,292 It's not actually gone. It's still there. 603 00:33:59,829 --> 00:34:03,315 So, we've ultimately adopted roughly the following rule... 604 00:34:03,375 --> 00:34:06,979 think of it as we anonymize the information within 18 months. 605 00:34:07,333 --> 00:34:10,228 It might be anonymized after 18 months 606 00:34:10,308 --> 00:34:13,368 but all of the searches that we've ever done are still there, 607 00:34:13,468 --> 00:34:17,021 the underlying data is still there to be de-anonymized at some point. 608 00:34:17,886 --> 00:34:21,780 (narrator) De-anonymizing search records turns out to be shockingly easy. 609 00:34:21,890 --> 00:34:25,471 That is, taking private searches and finding out whose records they are. 610 00:34:25,521 --> 00:34:28,950 In 2006, AOL turned over a bunch of these anonymized search records 611 00:34:28,990 --> 00:34:30,807 of their users to the public. 612 00:34:30,827 --> 00:34:33,352 And it only took a short few hours for a reporter to quote 613 00:34:33,412 --> 00:34:35,894 who user No. 4417749 was. 614 00:34:35,964 --> 00:34:38,530 Between search for things like "numb fingers", 615 00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:40,279 "60's single men" 616 00:34:40,339 --> 00:34:42,213 and "dog who urinates on everything", 617 00:34:42,283 --> 00:34:45,864 the reporter uncover a woman named Thelma Arnold; she was age 62. 618 00:34:46,274 --> 00:34:49,554 But then, there's user 17556639, 619 00:34:49,624 --> 00:34:52,365 who looked up "how to kill your wife" multiple times, 620 00:34:52,415 --> 00:34:54,847 along with "decapitated photos", 621 00:34:54,897 --> 00:34:58,023 but then, in the middle, the user actually looked up "steak and cheese"... 622 00:34:58,093 --> 00:35:00,005 ...steak and cheese? 623 00:35:00,696 --> 00:35:02,821 And there were plenty of users online who were quick to judge 624 00:35:02,881 --> 00:35:04,211 what was going on here. 625 00:35:04,301 --> 00:35:05,939 Yeap, it was murder. 626 00:35:12,668 --> 00:35:15,104 - Winnie, easy, easy -- - Hey, old friend! 627 00:35:15,104 --> 00:35:17,549 Take a sit down in here, I'm going to show you something. 628 00:35:17,549 --> 00:35:18,873 Ok. 629 00:35:19,227 --> 00:35:23,616 What I'm showing you here is a list of anonymized search records... 630 00:35:23,676 --> 00:35:27,473 these records were released by AOL. 631 00:35:27,903 --> 00:35:31,832 Are there actually things on this list that you know you searched for before? 632 00:35:31,892 --> 00:35:37,137 Awww... sure, yeah, I've definitely... I definitely looked up car crash photos, 633 00:35:37,227 --> 00:35:39,064 I've definitely typed in "decapitated", 634 00:35:39,124 --> 00:35:41,305 I've definitely looked up dead people photos... 635 00:35:41,385 --> 00:35:44,773 Awww... "wife killer", I've definitely looked up "wife killer", yeah. 636 00:35:45,293 --> 00:35:47,167 In fact, I've looked up every single search term 637 00:35:47,227 --> 00:35:48,801 we're looking at here. 638 00:35:48,841 --> 00:35:51,066 [narrator] You see, Jerome has been a writer on "Cold Case", 639 00:35:51,096 --> 00:35:54,089 a TV show where each week cops have to solve a murder mystery. 640 00:35:54,310 --> 00:35:57,548 That's always what scared me when I was entering those search terms 641 00:35:57,898 --> 00:35:59,729 was if there's some kind of automated system 642 00:35:59,799 --> 00:36:01,660 that just red-flags you based on search terms 643 00:36:01,700 --> 00:36:03,563 they're not going to look and say, 644 00:36:03,603 --> 00:36:06,116 "Oh, yeah, you're probably working on a TV show, 645 00:36:06,307 --> 00:36:08,985 and that's why he was just Googling "how to murder my cheating wife". 646 00:36:09,004 --> 00:36:10,233 (wife) What? 647 00:36:10,303 --> 00:36:11,373 (door opening]) 648 00:36:11,393 --> 00:36:12,780 I just wanted to confirm that I had not murdered you 649 00:36:12,810 --> 00:36:14,527 and that you're alive. 650 00:36:14,727 --> 00:36:17,487 (wife) No, I'm allowed to come out of this room. (laughter]) 651 00:36:17,597 --> 00:36:20,698 - And our baby's safe. - Ok, good. 652 00:36:20,948 --> 00:36:23,127 - He has a clean diaper. - Awww... thank God. 653 00:36:23,208 --> 00:36:26,284 So, we can rest assured you are not a murderer. 654 00:36:26,704 --> 00:36:28,826 I'm not a murderer. 655 00:36:28,886 --> 00:36:30,163 You're a writer. 656 00:36:30,224 --> 00:36:31,854 I'm a writer. 657 00:36:31,934 --> 00:36:33,442 - Ok. - Glad we can clear that up. 658 00:36:34,021 --> 00:36:36,437 Glad we can clear that up. 659 00:36:36,745 --> 00:36:39,789 (narrator) So, what would happen if that red-flag system did exist? 660 00:36:40,148 --> 00:36:43,012 If a dad like Jerome might someday have his door knocked on 661 00:36:43,052 --> 00:36:45,565 because his search records became pubic? 662 00:36:52,346 --> 00:36:55,396 Consensus seems to be that retention of this kind of information 663 00:36:55,486 --> 00:36:57,899 should be greater than zero days, 664 00:36:57,969 --> 00:37:01,564 and the reason is it has to do with police actions, terrorists, 665 00:37:01,624 --> 00:37:04,437 Patriot Act, all of these sort of things. 666 00:37:04,561 --> 00:37:07,112 It turns out that in this environment, the digital environment, 667 00:37:07,182 --> 00:37:09,409 there is a loophole to the Fourth Amendment 668 00:37:09,449 --> 00:37:12,291 which is, if a third party collects a lot of this information 669 00:37:12,341 --> 00:37:14,833 the government doesn't have to go through those same hoops, 670 00:37:14,933 --> 00:37:17,083 that's called the Third-Party Doctrine. 671 00:37:17,143 --> 00:37:19,727 The Third-Party Doctrine means 672 00:37:19,777 --> 00:37:22,800 that when you as a consumer share your data with a bank, 673 00:37:22,840 --> 00:37:24,574 with an e-mail provider, 674 00:37:24,614 --> 00:37:26,391 with a search engine, 675 00:37:26,741 --> 00:37:28,781 with any kind of technology company, 676 00:37:28,841 --> 00:37:32,655 you have basically given up what would have been 677 00:37:32,695 --> 00:37:35,505 your Fourth Amendment protections over that data. 678 00:37:36,337 --> 00:37:39,146 For the government to get information from a Google or a Facebook, 679 00:37:39,196 --> 00:37:41,196 it's a lot easier than the government doing it itself, 680 00:37:41,236 --> 00:37:43,502 by putting a wiretap on our phones. 681 00:37:43,749 --> 00:37:45,739 Large companies like Google and Facebook 682 00:37:45,779 --> 00:37:49,529 receive thousands of requests a year from government agencies. 683 00:37:49,699 --> 00:37:52,670 Facebook has 25 employees doing nothing but surveillance. 684 00:37:52,870 --> 00:37:55,564 And these companies routinely receive requests, 685 00:37:55,694 --> 00:37:57,398 they process the requests-- 686 00:37:57,468 --> 00:37:59,403 You may be surprised to hear 687 00:37:59,433 --> 00:38:02,360 the secret search of e-mails by the government seems to be commonplace. 688 00:38:03,337 --> 00:38:08,983 Law that governs when the government can get electronic communications, 689 00:38:09,152 --> 00:38:11,876 like e-mails and things that are stored remotely, 690 00:38:11,986 --> 00:38:14,226 was written in 1986. 691 00:38:14,777 --> 00:38:17,249 And can have effects that allow the government 692 00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:21,452 to at least claim they should be able to get location data without a warrant 693 00:38:21,772 --> 00:38:23,794 or, at one point, the government was claiming 694 00:38:23,814 --> 00:38:27,530 that it doesn't need a warrant to get emails that you've opened. 695 00:38:35,122 --> 00:38:37,614 Well, in the spring of 2011, 696 00:38:37,694 --> 00:38:40,039 the Department of Justice and, in particular, the FBI, 697 00:38:40,109 --> 00:38:42,069 made several requests 698 00:38:42,109 --> 00:38:43,274 to Internet companies 699 00:38:43,335 --> 00:38:46,795 as part of an investigation leading to individuals associated with WikiLeaks. 700 00:38:47,241 --> 00:38:52,246 We released 400,000 classified documents. 701 00:38:52,601 --> 00:38:55,543 (narrator) For those of you who didn't know who Julian Assange is, 702 00:38:55,543 --> 00:38:57,655 he started WikiLeaks. 703 00:38:57,725 --> 00:39:00,175 Now, in the past WikiLeaks has released secret documents related 704 00:39:00,205 --> 00:39:03,113 to the Iraq war, Guantanamo Bay, and Afghanistan. 705 00:39:03,689 --> 00:39:07,633 And that's obviously a positive development 706 00:39:08,112 --> 00:39:10,514 for those of us who think that information 707 00:39:11,474 --> 00:39:14,048 should be more accessible, almost no matter what. 708 00:39:14,298 --> 00:39:16,133 You know, obviously, it's a threatening development 709 00:39:16,173 --> 00:39:21,676 for those institutions, like corporations in many cases, that depend on secrecy. 710 00:39:22,199 --> 00:39:25,054 I condemn the action that WikiLeaks has taken. 711 00:39:25,164 --> 00:39:27,880 It puts at risk our national security. 712 00:39:28,187 --> 00:39:32,877 Twitter received an order that requested data regarding certain Twitter users. 713 00:39:33,026 --> 00:39:37,717 These were all users that were related to the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks. 714 00:39:38,186 --> 00:39:41,571 However, it wasn't just an order, it was actually a de-order, 715 00:39:41,731 --> 00:39:43,504 and it came with a gag order. 716 00:39:43,544 --> 00:39:46,387 It required that Twitter never speak publicly 717 00:39:46,437 --> 00:39:48,187 about the fact that they've received this request. 718 00:39:48,888 --> 00:39:51,227 (TV) Denouncing the move, Assange said he believes 719 00:39:51,347 --> 00:39:54,878 other American Internet companies, such as Facebook and Google, 720 00:39:54,908 --> 00:39:57,543 may also have been ordered to disclose information. 721 00:39:57,653 --> 00:40:00,807 Companies like Amazon, Yahoo, Dropbox... 722 00:40:01,256 --> 00:40:07,117 even Facebook, will be capable of handing data to the government 723 00:40:07,207 --> 00:40:09,126 without first informing users. 724 00:40:09,647 --> 00:40:11,991 Even if you think what the people are doing is wrong, 725 00:40:12,971 --> 00:40:15,624 that's why the First Amendment exist: 726 00:40:15,904 --> 00:40:21,402 to protect unpopular people engaging in unpopular speech. 727 00:40:22,084 --> 00:40:23,624 (narrator) But Twitter fought back. 728 00:40:23,684 --> 00:40:26,497 They released the information of the users and let them know ahead of time, 729 00:40:26,627 --> 00:40:29,430 and they were successful in getting the gag order overturned. 730 00:40:29,950 --> 00:40:32,950 Meanwhile, Amazon, Paypal, Mastercard and Visa, 731 00:40:32,950 --> 00:40:35,331 they all gave in to the pressure regarding their users. 732 00:40:35,502 --> 00:40:40,553 You know, a culture of loyalty to not you but a greater cause is important, 733 00:40:40,683 --> 00:40:42,620 to be successful, it seems like to me... 734 00:40:42,760 --> 00:40:44,994 and it's disloyal, in this case, to the country. 735 00:40:45,312 --> 00:40:47,406 (narrator) Well, President Bush might think it's disloyal. 736 00:40:47,447 --> 00:40:49,345 Thanks to Twitter standing up for the privacy of activists 737 00:40:49,385 --> 00:40:52,312 like Julian Assange, you can now be shown this. 738 00:40:52,693 --> 00:41:00,299 Today we released over 287 files documenting the reality 739 00:41:00,590 --> 00:41:04,020 of the international mass surveillance industry. 740 00:41:04,190 --> 00:41:11,649 An industry which now sells equipment to dictators and democracies alike, 741 00:41:12,128 --> 00:41:16,478 in order to intercept entire populations. 742 00:41:17,307 --> 00:41:19,519 9/11 has provided a license 743 00:41:20,899 --> 00:41:26,501 for European countries, for the USA, 744 00:41:26,521 --> 00:41:30,372 Australia, Canada, South Africa and others 745 00:41:31,142 --> 00:41:33,536 to develop spying systems that affect all of us. 746 00:41:40,775 --> 00:41:42,953 (narrator) The Spy Files shows the massive industry 747 00:41:42,993 --> 00:41:45,060 that surrounds selling to US government 748 00:41:45,090 --> 00:41:47,220 and governments around the world. 749 00:41:47,521 --> 00:41:49,607 Instead of having something called the Information Awareness Act, 750 00:41:49,627 --> 00:41:52,842 which depicts a symbol with the eye of the pyramid looking everybody, 751 00:41:52,942 --> 00:41:55,699 and scanning the world with this sinister laser beam... 752 00:41:56,168 --> 00:41:58,689 Instead, let's just have a bunch of companies that exist 753 00:41:58,739 --> 00:42:01,128 that are providing bits of those capabilities, 754 00:42:01,158 --> 00:42:03,313 and they are provided under the contracts, 755 00:42:03,363 --> 00:42:05,601 that you got for the same agencies, the same people. 756 00:42:05,900 --> 00:42:08,697 One of the most popular is called the 'massive intercept', 757 00:42:09,206 --> 00:42:12,512 and basically, what governments are trying to do with this 758 00:42:13,052 --> 00:42:17,153 is to get as much information as possible from our communications, 759 00:42:17,213 --> 00:42:21,403 so they can analyze that, and detect patterns in that. 760 00:42:21,523 --> 00:42:24,622 It's interesting, you know, in your article you talk about 761 00:42:24,672 --> 00:42:26,776 - the secretive nature of the business-- - Right. 762 00:42:26,816 --> 00:42:29,854 that they sell through trade shows which are not open to the media... 763 00:42:29,962 --> 00:42:33,677 (narrator) But we actually went to one of these conventions. It was pretty easy, 764 00:42:33,727 --> 00:42:36,142 we just called and asked for a pass. 765 00:42:37,032 --> 00:42:38,906 So, we talked with a representative for one of these companies, 766 00:42:38,926 --> 00:42:40,799 a firm called Cellebrite. 767 00:42:40,819 --> 00:42:42,674 They were included in the Spy Files. 768 00:42:42,714 --> 00:42:44,747 They're a company that sells cellphone extraction tools 769 00:42:44,797 --> 00:42:47,230 to every major government sector in the US. 770 00:42:47,751 --> 00:42:50,002 So, my name is Christopher Shin, 771 00:42:50,052 --> 00:42:52,659 I'm the Vice-President of Engineering for Cellebrite USA. 772 00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:54,811 Today, I'm presenting to you 773 00:42:54,841 --> 00:42:57,291 the Cellebrite UFED System, to my right here. 774 00:42:57,932 --> 00:43:03,144 It is a device used to extract countless information from mobile devices 775 00:43:03,645 --> 00:43:07,460 so, text messages, pictures, video, audio, call log, that kind of things... 776 00:43:07,641 --> 00:43:11,185 it's used by agencies across the United States and the world. 777 00:43:11,666 --> 00:43:14,544 Yes, the iPhone, specifically, stores a lot of information, 778 00:43:14,595 --> 00:43:16,835 more than your normal handset. 779 00:43:16,895 --> 00:43:20,490 It really is a digital store of your personal and business life... 780 00:43:21,671 --> 00:43:25,200 This is why the field has actually been growing exponentially 781 00:43:25,270 --> 00:43:27,100 over the last couple of years. 782 00:43:27,280 --> 00:43:29,780 As the devices get more complex, they can hold more information, 783 00:43:29,830 --> 00:43:33,661 this is one of the most personal devices to you today, even more than your laptop. 784 00:43:33,731 --> 00:43:37,098 We think of ourselves as basically, a tool manufacturer, 785 00:43:37,148 --> 00:43:40,409 just like, you know, Glock or Beretta producing firearms, 786 00:43:40,459 --> 00:43:44,830 we're producing a tool that does a certain task, 787 00:43:44,950 --> 00:43:47,078 and we're marketing that tool only towards... 788 00:43:47,148 --> 00:43:50,386 just like you can't buy... you go out and buy a hand gun without credentials, 789 00:43:50,426 --> 00:43:52,658 we're not just selling it to everybody. 790 00:43:52,748 --> 00:43:54,738 (interviewer) "But... could you conceivably sell it 791 00:43:54,778 --> 00:43:56,390 or, are there laws against it?" 792 00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:58,875 There are no laws against selling this 793 00:43:58,935 --> 00:44:02,048 to someone who is not in law enforcement, the government, or something like that. 794 00:44:02,468 --> 00:44:04,086 Someone who wants to dump my phone tomorrow 795 00:44:04,116 --> 00:44:06,106 they might get a laugh at the content in it, 796 00:44:06,246 --> 00:44:08,377 but I don't think I'll be put in jail. 797 00:44:08,417 --> 00:44:12,003 So, I think it really depends on how you look at it. 798 00:44:12,093 --> 00:44:15,347 I mean, there are privacy concerns but I'm a little bit more, I guess, 799 00:44:15,938 --> 00:44:20,096 the liberal side of my privacy being exposed. 800 00:44:20,186 --> 00:44:23,367 I mean, other people, of course... that's a completely personal view. 801 00:44:23,698 --> 00:44:28,407 My phone itself, I mean, I... I actually take that back, 802 00:44:28,487 --> 00:44:31,748 I have a lot of work-related information on my Blackberry 803 00:44:31,818 --> 00:44:36,861 so, if this information did get out, probably I would be pretty concerned. 804 00:44:37,762 --> 00:44:40,808 The surveillance vendors target two types of customers. 805 00:44:41,267 --> 00:44:43,312 They target governments directly, 806 00:44:43,362 --> 00:44:46,255 and they also target Internet service providers 807 00:44:46,365 --> 00:44:49,113 and telecommunications carriers, 808 00:44:49,153 --> 00:44:52,569 who are tasked with the responsibility of spying on their own customers. 809 00:44:53,466 --> 00:44:55,471 (narrator) For example, it was a little piece of software 810 00:44:55,501 --> 00:44:57,999 that has been installed in every phone in America. 811 00:44:58,269 --> 00:45:00,985 This software is called Carrier IQ. 812 00:45:01,344 --> 00:45:04,255 And thanks to a little video the system's administrators 813 00:45:04,325 --> 00:45:06,340 from Connecticut posted on YouTube, 814 00:45:06,440 --> 00:45:10,171 the world now knows that this software has been monitoring our every key stroke. 815 00:45:10,832 --> 00:45:15,436 (dialing) (automatic operator speaking) "Dial 63, and so on, and so forth..." 816 00:45:15,976 --> 00:45:18,669 (narrator) According to Carrier IQ Chief Marketer, they're aware 817 00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:21,346 this information is sensitive, and call it a treasure trove. 818 00:45:21,376 --> 00:45:24,109 It became big enough of a deal that Al Franken 819 00:45:24,159 --> 00:45:26,159 decided to take this issue to Congress. 820 00:45:27,593 --> 00:45:30,797 Mr. Director, millions of Americans have smart phones 821 00:45:30,897 --> 00:45:35,726 with a pre-installed software signed by a company called Carrier IQ. 822 00:45:36,666 --> 00:45:42,167 Recent research has shown that it captures a broad range of sensitive information... 823 00:45:42,427 --> 00:45:44,832 Let me start up by saying that we had neither sought nor obtained 824 00:45:45,101 --> 00:45:48,301 any information from Carrier IQ in anyone of our investigations. 825 00:45:48,756 --> 00:45:52,837 Not directly from Carrier, but what about from the wireless carriers? 826 00:45:53,305 --> 00:45:55,512 No, I don't believe so. 827 00:45:55,572 --> 00:45:58,171 If you're specifying use 828 00:45:58,211 --> 00:46:05,554 of the Carrier IQ software by another wireless carrier... 829 00:46:05,654 --> 00:46:07,770 ... have we sought that? 830 00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:09,385 I do not know, 831 00:46:09,545 --> 00:46:12,635 and the information we seek from wireless carriers, or what have you-- 832 00:46:12,846 --> 00:46:17,467 and I'm not talking about Carrier IQ, I'm talking about wireless carrier... 833 00:46:17,747 --> 00:46:19,684 - Right. - that we may have obtained information 834 00:46:19,754 --> 00:46:23,416 that in some way Carrier IQ may have been involved with. 835 00:46:24,201 --> 00:46:26,475 (narrator) Why would the FBI need Carrier IQ send them 836 00:46:26,515 --> 00:46:28,249 all of this information? 837 00:46:28,269 --> 00:46:31,075 After all, they could be using any of these services 838 00:46:31,145 --> 00:46:33,577 that were included in the Spy Files. 839 00:46:33,637 --> 00:46:35,816 Take this product, for instance, Scan & Target, 840 00:46:35,876 --> 00:46:38,484 which claims that it can search through the SMSs, the IMs, 841 00:46:38,534 --> 00:46:40,666 Twitter, e-mails, Facebook, blogs and forums, 842 00:46:40,736 --> 00:46:43,894 or analyze huge volumes of information in real time. 843 00:46:44,783 --> 00:46:45,944 Or FinFisher, which demonstrate 844 00:46:46,003 --> 00:46:48,326 how the police can infiltrate anyone's systems, 845 00:46:48,426 --> 00:46:50,765 through a variety of videos that used to be available 846 00:46:50,795 --> 00:46:52,344 on their website. 847 00:46:52,374 --> 00:46:55,584 They even showed an agent hacking into Google and Facebook in their demo. 848 00:46:56,704 --> 00:46:59,057 (interviewer) "Who has this kind of equipment?" 849 00:46:59,828 --> 00:47:04,396 Massive interception equipment is sold by surveillance vendors around the world. 850 00:47:04,937 --> 00:47:08,598 So, it's really up for grabs for anyone who wants it and can pay the price. 851 00:47:08,698 --> 00:47:11,990 (narrator) The FinFisher system was sold to Egypt to monitor people 852 00:47:12,019 --> 00:47:13,555 who opposed their leader. 853 00:47:13,595 --> 00:47:15,894 These are the actual documents. 854 00:47:15,964 --> 00:47:20,040 It even includes training for 2 - 4 people for the low, low price of about $11,000. 855 00:47:20,800 --> 00:47:22,523 Or the Hacking Team Project, 856 00:47:22,553 --> 00:47:25,319 which advertises that it can track hundred of thousands of cell phones, 857 00:47:25,449 --> 00:47:26,855 all in one system. 858 00:47:27,024 --> 00:47:30,482 Or software, like Kapow, that analyzes all social networks, 859 00:47:30,692 --> 00:47:33,893 and features the ability to search out key words and phrases. 860 00:47:34,873 --> 00:47:36,645 Everything that happens on Facebook, 861 00:47:36,695 --> 00:47:38,620 and it shows the frequency of the conversation 862 00:47:38,730 --> 00:47:41,196 between one person to another, that kind of things. 863 00:47:41,681 --> 00:47:43,921 $That allows us for a lot of profiling, 864 00:47:43,981 --> 00:47:47,310 it creates massive databases for law enforcement to exploit, 865 00:47:47,410 --> 00:47:48,704 and often misread. 866 00:47:49,154 --> 00:47:51,575 (narrator) With hundreds of companies offering these services, 867 00:47:51,625 --> 00:47:54,461 why would the FBI need to use Carrier IQ? 868 00:47:54,541 --> 00:47:57,720 Everything coming from a cell phone, everything coming from a computer, 869 00:47:58,100 --> 00:48:00,656 anything that's going over the Internet 870 00:48:00,696 --> 00:48:03,057 out of the country, or even internal within the country, 871 00:48:03,437 --> 00:48:05,415 can be monitored using this kind of equipment. 872 00:48:05,445 --> 00:48:08,205 If you look at news stories now about what they call Big Data, 873 00:48:08,255 --> 00:48:11,965 Big Data is really looking at the question of 874 00:48:12,174 --> 00:48:16,500 how can governments and corporations work with that data 875 00:48:16,620 --> 00:48:22,017 in order to look for anomalies and predict when you're going to do something, 876 00:48:22,087 --> 00:48:24,366 so they can stop you from doing it. 877 00:48:24,866 --> 00:48:27,238 (narrator) And the government isn't that secretive about it. 878 00:48:27,458 --> 00:48:29,677 If you visit their business website, there's an application there 879 00:48:29,737 --> 00:48:31,962 looking for developers to create better tools 880 00:48:31,972 --> 00:48:34,038 for mass surveillance for online activities. 881 00:48:34,098 --> 00:48:36,981 Examples of surveillance include, but are not limited to: 882 00:48:37,150 --> 00:48:42,091 Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, Twitter, Facebook, etc. 883 00:48:42,741 --> 00:48:45,511 Which brings us back to that word that you find in any user's agreement. 884 00:48:45,992 --> 00:48:48,636 It's the word that sent us down this whole path in the first place: 885 00:48:48,736 --> 00:48:49,891 "Prevent." 886 00:48:49,982 --> 00:48:51,979 So, this might make you wonder, 887 00:48:52,048 --> 00:48:54,564 what potential threat would all of this surveillance we agreed to 888 00:48:54,684 --> 00:48:56,460 actually prevent? 889 00:49:07,354 --> 00:49:11,353 Basically, January 3rd, 20 days before I go on holiday, I tweet: 890 00:49:12,143 --> 00:49:13,854 "Are you free this week for a quick gossip/prep 891 00:49:13,924 --> 00:49:15,925 before I go and destroy America?" 892 00:49:15,976 --> 00:49:18,997 Ended the twit with a kiss -- as threatening as that is, 893 00:49:19,166 --> 00:49:22,140 and 20 days later, got on a flight to go to LAX, 894 00:49:22,320 --> 00:49:25,076 we had a hotel in Hollywood Boulevard, 895 00:49:25,156 --> 00:49:26,762 where we were going to park around for a week, 896 00:49:26,852 --> 00:49:28,288 just looking around, just being tourists. 897 00:49:28,698 --> 00:49:31,434 Got off the plane, went through the passport control, 898 00:49:31,574 --> 00:49:33,366 swiped my passport through, and they said, "Can you come this way?". 899 00:49:33,436 --> 00:49:36,044 And I was like, I just got an Irish passport, so I thought 900 00:49:36,154 --> 00:49:39,586 maybe Irish people are stereotyped, IRA bombers... 901 00:49:39,666 --> 00:49:42,393 They went through my suitcase and, I was like... Awww, what are you doing? 902 00:49:43,183 --> 00:49:44,890 And then, when they put me in the holding room, 903 00:49:44,950 --> 00:49:47,666 they were questioning me for 5 hours whether I had a Twitter account... 904 00:49:47,926 --> 00:49:50,092 And I was like, "Are you being serious? Are you actually holding me 905 00:49:50,122 --> 00:49:51,308 because of a tweet?" 906 00:49:51,408 --> 00:49:54,116 And they were like, "What do you mean by destroy America?", 907 00:49:54,266 --> 00:49:58,083 and I was like... to party... it means, to go wild, to get drunk... 908 00:49:58,613 --> 00:50:02,350 Any moron that can read that tweet can see what it meant to us. 909 00:50:02,570 --> 00:50:04,371 It ends with a kiss. 910 00:50:04,841 --> 00:50:07,957 I'm sure Hitler doesn't end his memoirs with a kiss... or whatever he did. 911 00:50:08,097 --> 00:50:09,258 (laughter) 912 00:50:09,318 --> 00:50:11,368 So, then they moved us to a holding room, 913 00:50:11,418 --> 00:50:13,543 then at midnight the staff changed over, 914 00:50:13,613 --> 00:50:15,388 and they weren't aware of why we were there for, 915 00:50:15,418 --> 00:50:17,971 so the handcuffed us, stuck us in the back of a police van, 916 00:50:18,051 --> 00:50:21,042 and they took us to downtown, like a prison detention center... 917 00:50:23,482 --> 00:50:26,330 Innocent people shouldn't be treated like absolute dirt, 918 00:50:26,720 --> 00:50:29,626 and they were dragging us around, pushing us into walls... 919 00:50:29,776 --> 00:50:32,054 - It sounds like a horrible vacation-- - Awww... 920 00:50:32,454 --> 00:50:34,206 Is the government refunding you at least? 921 00:50:34,266 --> 00:50:37,654 No, they wouldn't comment on what happened. 922 00:50:38,254 --> 00:50:40,238 Well, if I could I was going to paint the town red, 923 00:50:40,428 --> 00:50:42,822 they'd have me down for graffiti as well, wouldn't they? 924 00:50:43,142 --> 00:50:45,137 When I go to other countries, this is going to show up, 925 00:50:45,317 --> 00:50:47,342 that I got refused from America, 926 00:50:47,572 --> 00:50:49,849 so more than likely, I'm now going to get dragged off every airport 927 00:50:49,919 --> 00:50:52,331 and questioned about what happened, 928 00:50:52,391 --> 00:50:54,741 and I'll have to explain to them that it was a tweet. 929 00:50:55,471 --> 00:50:59,210 My Italian, Irish, French, Portuguese, 930 00:50:59,300 --> 00:51:03,980 Native American, Black... I'm even 1/18 Avatar (laughter) 931 00:51:04,500 --> 00:51:06,356 (narrator) This is Joe Lipari. 932 00:51:06,436 --> 00:51:08,779 Joe Lipari had had a rough day at the Apple store. 933 00:51:08,819 --> 00:51:11,624 He's been forced to wait in line for 4 hours before finally leaving. 934 00:51:13,714 --> 00:51:17,102 So, I get home from the Apple store, still a little bit irritated... 935 00:51:18,612 --> 00:51:22,887 smoked a little dope, put on Fight Club, just trying to relax, go on Facebook... 936 00:51:23,807 --> 00:51:28,468 (TV) And this button-down, Oxford-cloth psycho might just snap, 937 00:51:28,568 --> 00:51:30,956 and then stalk from office to office... 938 00:51:31,376 --> 00:51:34,319 (Joe and TV) ...with an Armalite AR-10 carbine gas-powered semi-automatic weapon... 939 00:51:34,749 --> 00:51:37,532 And I said the same thing but except, for the Apple store. 940 00:51:38,222 --> 00:51:43,248 And, you know, basically word for word except for where. 941 00:51:43,908 --> 00:51:46,118 Hanging out on Facebook, getting ready to go to yoga class, 942 00:51:46,228 --> 00:51:49,385 there's a 'Shave and a Haircut' 'Two bits' knock on my door. 943 00:51:49,945 --> 00:51:53,689 So, I was like, maybe somebody is here to watch Fight Club with me. 944 00:51:53,819 --> 00:51:56,634 Opened it up, boom! 945 00:51:56,874 --> 00:52:00,094 NYPD SWAT have their bulletproof vests on, their guns drawn, 946 00:52:00,805 --> 00:52:03,652 and they tear the place apart! 947 00:52:04,332 --> 00:52:06,112 They really go through everything. 948 00:52:06,193 --> 00:52:09,776 Under one cup, you know, the guy finds a box that has all my military awards, 949 00:52:09,996 --> 00:52:12,446 he comes and brings it and says, "Oh, you were in the military?" 950 00:52:12,606 --> 00:52:15,866 Then we started talking army talk, he sees that I speak the language, 951 00:52:15,976 --> 00:52:19,215 and then is when he asks me, "Do you know what's an Armalite AR-10?", 952 00:52:19,745 --> 00:52:22,202 and I was like, "It's that why you're here, guys? 953 00:52:22,382 --> 00:52:25,490 You are here because I made a bad joke on Facebook?", 954 00:52:25,770 --> 00:52:28,660 like I... you know, it blew my mind. 955 00:52:29,330 --> 00:52:31,554 It's the ultimate buzz kill, really! 956 00:52:32,164 --> 00:52:34,530 Those Facebook pages brought a SWAT team to your house! 957 00:52:34,740 --> 00:52:37,636 They told me not to go far from New York 958 00:52:37,696 --> 00:52:40,164 because I'm gonna be needed for all these court cases for a year. 959 00:52:40,224 --> 00:52:44,586 They claimed one of my Facebook friends called 911. 960 00:52:47,095 --> 00:52:49,884 Which is another thing I think is bogus, 961 00:52:50,234 --> 00:52:52,124 so I asked for the 911 tape, 962 00:52:52,305 --> 00:52:55,137 which they keep on file, they have to. 963 00:52:55,268 --> 00:52:58,781 And it's my right, my stuff, they have to give me my mug shot if I want it. 964 00:52:59,491 --> 00:53:04,171 So they came back and said, "Oh, turned out it wasn't someone who called 911, 965 00:53:04,292 --> 00:53:06,371 it was just someone who walked-in to the police station 966 00:53:06,401 --> 00:53:08,265 and that's something we don't keep a record of." 967 00:53:08,665 --> 00:53:11,111 And how did you get my address? I've lived there for just 10 days. 968 00:53:11,572 --> 00:53:14,967 (laughter) I didn't update my mailing address yet, 969 00:53:15,467 --> 00:53:17,416 like all my banking stuff is still going to my old apartment, 970 00:53:17,476 --> 00:53:22,083 like there's nothing saying I lived there, except for a verbal agreement. 971 00:53:24,284 --> 00:53:26,132 Three minutes after being done with my lunch 972 00:53:26,182 --> 00:53:28,492 I was told to go up to the office, 973 00:53:28,582 --> 00:53:33,106 then I would sit down inside the Vice-Principal office, 974 00:53:33,196 --> 00:53:38,408 and I wasn't told what was going on until, maybe, 10 minutes later. 975 00:53:38,568 --> 00:53:40,219 (Timi Robertson) My phone rang and I looked at it, 976 00:53:40,259 --> 00:53:41,720 and it was the number of his school, 977 00:53:41,760 --> 00:53:44,180 and I answered it, and it was the school security guard 978 00:53:44,661 --> 00:53:47,446 just to giving me an FYI, you know... 979 00:53:47,506 --> 00:53:50,035 "For your information just to give you a heads up, 980 00:53:50,095 --> 00:53:52,232 the Secret Service is here with the Town Police Department, 981 00:53:52,302 --> 00:53:54,432 and they have Vito, and they're talking to him." 982 00:53:54,532 --> 00:53:58,007 (Vito) A man walked-in in a suit and glasses, 983 00:54:00,007 --> 00:54:04,900 and he said that he was part of the Secret Service, 984 00:54:04,940 --> 00:54:07,259 and he told me that it was because of a post that I'd made, 985 00:54:07,379 --> 00:54:10,563 and it's indicated as a threat towards the President. 986 00:54:10,643 --> 00:54:13,948 (narrator) Yes, a seventh-grade boy was visited by our FBI 987 00:54:13,988 --> 00:54:16,940 because of a red flag that came up in their spy system. 988 00:54:17,310 --> 00:54:21,876 I was saying how Osama is dead, and for Obama to be careful 989 00:54:21,946 --> 00:54:24,180 because there might be suicide bombers. 990 00:54:24,621 --> 00:54:26,609 (narrator) It didn't consider his age, 991 00:54:26,669 --> 00:54:30,115 or that his comment about Obama needing to 'Watch out!' was one of concern 992 00:54:30,175 --> 00:54:33,154 The machine simply determined that based in a series of words... 993 00:54:33,204 --> 00:54:35,603 Vito was a potential threat. 994 00:54:43,899 --> 00:54:49,526 Pre-crime, they believe, is potential breach to the peace. 995 00:54:51,205 --> 00:54:54,204 They believe that you might cause a crime. 996 00:54:55,795 --> 00:54:57,975 There are pre-crime arrests in minority report. 997 00:54:59,715 --> 00:55:01,798 Mr. Marks, by mandate of the District of Columbia 998 00:55:01,848 --> 00:55:03,030 Pre-crime Division, 999 00:55:03,070 --> 00:55:05,174 I'm placing you under arrest for the future murder of [Sarah Mars] 1000 00:55:05,234 --> 00:55:09,384 that is known to be taking place today, April 22nd, 0800 hours and 4 minutes. 1001 00:55:09,434 --> 00:55:11,199 No! I didn't do anything! 1002 00:55:11,249 --> 00:55:13,224 There's an arrest that happened on the Royal Wedding day 1003 00:55:13,284 --> 00:55:16,515 when I attended a Zombie Flashmob Wedding Picnic. 1004 00:55:18,014 --> 00:55:20,520 Myself and 4 other zombies were arrested preemptively 1005 00:55:20,580 --> 00:55:23,618 for potential breach to the peace. 1006 00:55:23,678 --> 00:55:25,491 Even if you dress up as a zombie, 1007 00:55:25,621 --> 00:55:27,917 it seems to me that the crime isn't really committed, 1008 00:55:28,026 --> 00:55:29,854 - until you eat some brains-- - Yeap. 1009 00:55:29,994 --> 00:55:32,972 To be fair, we did have some "brain cake", so there's that...? 1010 00:55:33,231 --> 00:55:36,471 How did they know that you were going to be dressing up as a zombie this day? 1011 00:55:36,611 --> 00:55:38,886 There could have been e-mails, or anything... 1012 00:55:38,986 --> 00:55:41,175 There could have been, it's hard to know, yeah. 1013 00:55:41,386 --> 00:55:43,348 I think that-- - That's a scary thing, yeah. 1014 00:55:43,398 --> 00:55:47,565 The indication that they were monitoring private social networks 1015 00:55:47,675 --> 00:55:50,375 came in the way we were reacting to certain things, 1016 00:55:50,415 --> 00:55:52,198 and asking us certain things. 1017 00:55:52,228 --> 00:55:54,499 They were asking about "maggots" and asking about "climbing gear", 1018 00:55:54,559 --> 00:55:56,743 which they might have heard about through some exchanges on the Internet. 1019 00:55:56,793 --> 00:55:59,388 Neither of which is true, nobody had maggots or climbing gear. 1020 00:55:59,548 --> 00:56:04,066 Not something that was itself posing a hazard to the Royal Wedding celebrations 1021 00:56:04,126 --> 00:56:06,339 we were nowhere near the Royal Wedding celebrations, 1022 00:56:06,400 --> 00:56:09,393 and we had no plan of going near the Royal Wedding celebrations. 1023 00:56:09,473 --> 00:56:15,331 Anything that wasn't part of the official, ostentatious, joyous expensive celebration 1024 00:56:15,402 --> 00:56:20,723 of this wedding of two strangers, was prevented from happening. 1025 00:56:20,923 --> 00:56:23,923 And that seems deeply disturbing. 1026 00:56:24,503 --> 00:56:27,288 You can see the surveillance measures are being used to silence protests 1027 00:56:27,539 --> 00:56:29,458 before they even happen. 1028 00:56:29,608 --> 00:56:31,618 Yes, this was of course the Royal Wedding... 1029 00:56:32,468 --> 00:56:37,564 We'd all helped pay for the Royal Wedding, you know, it wasn't just a private wedding 1030 00:56:38,814 --> 00:56:40,319 You're arresting a professor of anthropology 1031 00:56:40,369 --> 00:56:42,395 that runs a street theater group... 1032 00:56:42,456 --> 00:56:44,763 [people talking and shouting] 1033 00:56:46,693 --> 00:56:48,297 We couldn't believe this was happening, 1034 00:56:48,458 --> 00:56:50,535 we were so obviously a street theater troupe. 1035 00:56:51,495 --> 00:56:53,664 Some of us, had actually gotten a costume on, you know. 1036 00:56:54,113 --> 00:56:57,285 So, we were locked away in Lewisham Police Station for 25 hours, 1037 00:56:57,876 --> 00:57:00,103 once the whole wedding was safely over, we were let out. 1038 00:57:01,554 --> 00:57:03,990 For the first time, as far as I'm aware in this country, 1039 00:57:04,329 --> 00:57:07,191 a number of us, something like 50 of us, 1040 00:57:07,241 --> 00:57:11,339 were arrested, and in most cases, incarcerated, 1041 00:57:11,450 --> 00:57:14,715 for thinking about protest, 1042 00:57:14,795 --> 00:57:17,441 for thinking about, in this case, some street theater. 1043 00:57:21,750 --> 00:57:24,838 A lot of life is based upon trust... 1044 00:57:25,147 --> 00:57:29,080 If you have a conversation with your inner circle 1045 00:57:29,641 --> 00:57:34,265 on a key strategic decision that is vital to your company, 1046 00:57:34,816 --> 00:57:37,799 and you read about it in the newspaper before the decision is implemented, 1047 00:57:37,859 --> 00:57:42,396 so it's preempted from acting because somebody inside your company has talked, 1048 00:57:42,477 --> 00:57:44,864 you aren't going to like it, and it'll hurt. 1049 00:57:45,704 --> 00:57:47,795 (narrator) The activists didn't need to commit any crime. 1050 00:57:47,875 --> 00:57:51,187 They just needed to text, to e-mail, and to call each other 1051 00:57:51,357 --> 00:57:53,250 about potentially protesting. 1052 00:57:53,430 --> 00:57:57,756 But I think that the answer is not to take away the capacity of looking at 1053 00:57:57,786 --> 00:58:00,912 the public action of citizens and keeping a record of it, 1054 00:58:01,161 --> 00:58:03,859 the solution is to make sure that we elect better governments. 1055 00:58:04,258 --> 00:58:07,232 (interviewer) "So, one of the things I hear a lot is, 1056 00:58:07,493 --> 00:58:10,573 who cares if they're collecting all this information about me, 1057 00:58:10,683 --> 00:58:13,872 I don't have anything to hide so, why does it matter?" 1058 00:58:14,722 --> 00:58:21,185 Well, I know this argument and it is not very new, 1059 00:58:22,455 --> 00:58:30,090 it's old-fashion saying we are complying with rules so, what happens? 1060 00:58:30,971 --> 00:58:34,951 Between leading the sinful life that I would like to lead, 1061 00:58:35,000 --> 00:58:37,228 and hoping that the government will protect my privacy 1062 00:58:37,268 --> 00:58:39,477 or, assuming that no one is going to protect my privacy 1063 00:58:39,518 --> 00:58:41,946 and leading a less sinful life, 1064 00:58:42,025 --> 00:58:46,168 I'd go with the latter... simply, just the odds of success seem higher to me. 1065 00:58:47,098 --> 00:58:49,455 I congratulate the people that say they have nothing to hide. 1066 00:58:49,606 --> 00:58:51,543 I don't believe them, and I'd also say 1067 00:58:51,603 --> 00:58:54,786 that they're probably hiding something from someone. We all do. 1068 00:58:54,846 --> 00:58:57,047 You have nothing to hide till you do. 1069 00:58:57,648 --> 00:59:01,193 And you're not necessarily going to know what you have to hide or not. 1070 00:59:08,337 --> 00:59:10,430 (narrator) You might remember the case of Milly, 1071 00:59:10,470 --> 00:59:14,036 a teenage girl in Britain who disappeared in 2002. 1072 00:59:14,496 --> 00:59:17,756 (TV) "Police in Surrey say they're growing increasingly concerned 1073 00:59:17,896 --> 00:59:20,700 about the safety of the 13-year-old girl who hasn't been seen 1074 00:59:20,770 --> 00:59:22,784 since Thursday afternoon." 1075 00:59:23,263 --> 00:59:25,188 (narrator) Before the police found her body, 1076 00:59:25,318 --> 00:59:27,931 her parents were holding onto hopes that she might still be alive. 1077 00:59:29,450 --> 00:59:33,915 I want to say if someone has taken Milly and is holding her, 1078 00:59:34,114 --> 00:59:37,032 then please, please, giver her back to us... 1079 00:59:37,162 --> 00:59:39,628 (narrator) Why is that, you might ask. 1080 00:59:39,688 --> 00:59:42,255 Well, because according to phone records, 1081 00:59:42,525 --> 00:59:44,741 Milly has checked and deleted her voicemail. 1082 00:59:45,200 --> 00:59:48,334 We were sitting downstairs in reception and I rang her phone... 1083 00:59:48,605 --> 00:59:51,848 - Yes. - and it clicked through onto her voice message, 1084 00:59:51,968 --> 00:59:53,898 - so I heard her voice-- - Yes. 1085 00:59:54,047 --> 00:59:56,220 and I was... it was just like I jumped, 1086 00:59:56,430 --> 00:59:59,324 "She's picked up her voicemails, Bob, she's alive!", and I was just... 1087 01:00:00,044 --> 01:00:01,478 it was then, really. 1088 01:00:01,879 --> 01:00:04,382 (narrator) As it turned out, members of the Rupert Murdoch's Corporation 1089 01:00:04,442 --> 01:00:06,448 had been hacking into Milly's phone, 1090 01:00:06,508 --> 01:00:09,806 trying to be the first to reveal details of this national news story. 1091 01:00:10,906 --> 01:00:12,488 I think this is the watershed moment 1092 01:00:12,558 --> 01:00:17,769 when finally the public start to see, and feel above all, 1093 01:00:17,949 --> 01:00:23,920 just how low and how disgusting this particular newspaper's methods were. 1094 01:00:24,659 --> 01:00:26,854 This was a murdered schoolgirl, 1095 01:00:26,884 --> 01:00:34,195 and the thought of a very tight-knit circle of very senior politicians, 1096 01:00:35,115 --> 01:00:38,490 linked up very closely, intimately, with the police 1097 01:00:38,921 --> 01:00:42,585 and with the media mogul, Rupert Murdoch. 1098 01:00:44,505 --> 01:00:46,285 (TV) For 30 years, as British Prime Ministers came, 1099 01:00:46,365 --> 01:00:47,856 and most certainly went, 1100 01:00:47,896 --> 01:00:51,615 a constant character in their worlds was Rupert Murdoch. 1101 01:00:52,896 --> 01:00:55,596 The billionaire media mogul whose press... 1102 01:00:55,646 --> 01:00:57,960 (narrator) For years, celebrities and individuals like Milly, 1103 01:00:58,039 --> 01:01:00,836 had their voicemail, they thought was hidden in private, 1104 01:01:00,916 --> 01:01:03,029 accessed by Rupert Murdoch Corporation, 1105 01:01:03,089 --> 01:01:05,537 at the expense of people like Milly's parents, 1106 01:01:05,567 --> 01:01:09,971 and it took nearly a decade to expose the misuse of this highly personal data. 1107 01:01:17,224 --> 01:01:20,344 Transparency which bonds us together and gives us so many friends 1108 01:01:20,374 --> 01:01:22,517 that we didn't know before, (laughter) 1109 01:01:22,557 --> 01:01:24,682 but all these friends are connected, 1110 01:01:24,772 --> 01:01:30,834 gives the state, an absolutely unparalleled in the history of humanity, 1111 01:01:30,944 --> 01:01:35,808 ability to know what's going on with its citizens, 1112 01:01:35,888 --> 01:01:38,217 to find out who the dissenters are... 1113 01:01:38,267 --> 01:01:41,191 The government is making whistle-blowing a crime. 1114 01:01:42,852 --> 01:01:45,726 They are making dissent a crime, 1115 01:01:46,485 --> 01:01:48,599 especially when it embarrasses the government 1116 01:01:48,679 --> 01:01:50,834 and calls the government into account. 1117 01:01:50,964 --> 01:01:53,308 Sources are going to get discovered, 1118 01:01:53,358 --> 01:01:57,050 and if whistle-blowers cannot securely and anonymously 1119 01:01:57,100 --> 01:01:59,035 provide their information to journalists, 1120 01:01:59,115 --> 01:02:01,779 we as a society won't know when our rights are being 1121 01:02:01,869 --> 01:02:03,531 silently violated. 1122 01:02:15,902 --> 01:02:17,945 Of course the President has defended his administration... 1123 01:02:19,294 --> 01:02:20,785 the only way he knows how. 1124 01:02:20,935 --> 01:02:23,846 If we can root out folks who have leaked, 1125 01:02:24,675 --> 01:02:26,837 they will suffer consequences. 1126 01:02:27,416 --> 01:02:29,499 (laughter) 1127 01:02:37,474 --> 01:02:39,699 If you look at the technical perspective, 1128 01:02:39,760 --> 01:02:41,513 the technologies of maintaining privacy 1129 01:02:41,573 --> 01:02:45,128 are actually running ahead of the technologiess that break it. 1130 01:02:45,178 --> 01:02:48,398 For example, encryption, which can maintain your privacy, 1131 01:02:48,538 --> 01:02:50,412 is running ahead of decryption. 1132 01:02:50,492 --> 01:02:52,469 (narrator) But what if there's a way to store information 1133 01:02:52,529 --> 01:02:54,036 until it can be decrypted? 1134 01:02:54,596 --> 01:02:56,403 Intelligence officials will soon be allowed 1135 01:02:56,433 --> 01:02:59,917 to keep information on US citizens much longer than they used to, 1136 01:03:00,516 --> 01:03:03,915 even if those citizens have not known ties to terrorism. 1137 01:03:04,064 --> 01:03:08,176 Under new rules, the government can store data it's gathered for 5 years, 1138 01:03:08,436 --> 01:03:10,511 that's up from the current limit of 6 months. 1139 01:03:11,191 --> 01:03:17,056 General Alexander, if Dick Cheney were elected President 1140 01:03:17,126 --> 01:03:22,276 and wanted to detain and incessantly waterboard every American 1141 01:03:22,366 --> 01:03:26,647 who's sent an e-mail making fun of his well-known hunting mishaps, 1142 01:03:27,267 --> 01:03:33,373 what I'd like to know is does the NSA have the technological capacity 1143 01:03:34,463 --> 01:03:40,475 to identify those Cheney bashers, based upon the content of their e-mails. 1144 01:03:42,385 --> 01:03:45,427 In the United States, we would have to go through 1145 01:03:45,527 --> 01:03:49,319 an FBI process of warrant to get that, 1146 01:03:49,419 --> 01:03:51,461 and serve it to somebody to actually get it. 1147 01:03:52,281 --> 01:03:55,030 - But you do have capability of doing it?-- - Not in the United States. 1148 01:03:55,650 --> 01:03:58,616 New questions about the National Security Agency's 1149 01:03:58,646 --> 01:04:01,675 massive spy center under construction in the desert of Utah. 1150 01:04:02,205 --> 01:04:05,985 Once finished, it'll be five times the size of the US Capitol building. 1151 01:04:06,034 --> 01:04:08,600 The NSA is not allowed to spy on Americans, 1152 01:04:08,660 --> 01:04:12,223 but now a whistle-blower has come forward saying that the agency is doing it anyway. 1153 01:04:12,323 --> 01:04:16,770 This massive agency that is collecting a tremendous amount of information 1154 01:04:16,800 --> 01:04:20,552 every day by satellites, and tapping the cell phones, 1155 01:04:20,602 --> 01:04:24,014 and data links, and your computer e-mail links, and so forth. 1156 01:04:24,114 --> 01:04:29,523 And then it has to store it someplace and that's why they'll build Bluffdale. 1157 01:04:29,623 --> 01:04:32,465 So, it's going to cost 2 billion dollars 1158 01:04:32,505 --> 01:04:34,826 and it's being built in this area, 1159 01:04:34,927 --> 01:04:39,400 on a military base outside of Salt Lake City, in Bluffdale. 1160 01:04:39,810 --> 01:04:44,315 As I said, they had to actually extend the boundaries of the town, 1161 01:04:44,475 --> 01:04:46,158 so that it would fit into it. 1162 01:04:46,308 --> 01:04:49,672 And the whole purpose of this is the centerpiece 1163 01:04:49,993 --> 01:04:56,508 of this massive eavesdropping complex, this network created after 9/11. 1164 01:04:58,323 --> 01:05:02,895 The reality of information technology is that it progresses exponentially 1165 01:05:02,956 --> 01:05:04,847 --only information technology. 1166 01:05:04,908 --> 01:05:08,908 Exponential grow starts out very slow, looks like nothing is happening, 1167 01:05:08,997 --> 01:05:10,790 is doubling in time in little numbers, 1168 01:05:10,830 --> 01:05:13,016 and suddenly, it takes off... 1169 01:05:13,036 --> 01:05:15,237 and you've seen that with paradigm after paradigm, 1170 01:05:15,287 --> 01:05:17,573 like social networks in recent times. 1171 01:05:17,773 --> 01:05:22,301 (narrator) In 1984, to sort 1 GB of data cost $85,000. 1172 01:05:22,949 --> 01:05:26,534 By 2012, it cost about 5 cents. 1173 01:05:26,873 --> 01:05:30,083 In the city of Chongqing, there are about 500,000 cameras. 1174 01:05:30,160 --> 01:05:35,443 In 2012, the cost of permanently recording at high resolution feed was $300 million. 1175 01:05:35,890 --> 01:05:39,919 By year 2020, the projected cost is less than $3 million. 1176 01:05:40,258 --> 01:05:43,225 The UK is one of the cultures that introduced cameras 1177 01:05:43,265 --> 01:05:45,738 most ubiquitously and most quickly. 1178 01:05:45,828 --> 01:05:48,466 So far, the population seems fine with it. 1179 01:05:48,556 --> 01:05:51,984 If they weren't, they know who to call. 1180 01:05:52,153 --> 01:05:57,329 (narrator) There are 2,000 cameras, and soon there will be 3,000. 1181 01:05:57,639 --> 01:06:02,454 All of which feed into this control center housed in a secret location. 1182 01:06:03,294 --> 01:06:06,151 And I can call up in real time 1183 01:06:06,271 --> 01:06:10,386 all instances where a camera caught someone wearing a red shirt. 1184 01:06:10,456 --> 01:06:13,286 This is the shape and the size 1185 01:06:13,346 --> 01:06:16,188 of a potentially suspicious unattended package. 1186 01:06:16,388 --> 01:06:19,684 Many police departments set to use controversial new devices 1187 01:06:19,734 --> 01:06:22,309 capable of scanning people's faces, 1188 01:06:22,409 --> 01:06:25,360 then checking that information against a criminal database. 1189 01:06:26,060 --> 01:06:28,495 When we're at war, when you're protecting your society 1190 01:06:28,545 --> 01:06:30,871 against people who want come and kill civilians, 1191 01:06:31,441 --> 01:06:34,247 you have to be able to defend what we're doing. 1192 01:06:34,907 --> 01:06:36,831 You have to be able to defend our way of life, 1193 01:06:37,641 --> 01:06:40,683 and you have to put these powers into somebody's hand. 1194 01:06:40,873 --> 01:06:43,171 (narrator) According to the Brookings Institution, 1195 01:06:43,231 --> 01:06:46,236 "this kind of pervasive monitoring provides what amounts to a time machine 1196 01:06:46,276 --> 01:06:50,046 allowing authoritarian governments to perform retrospective surveillance." 1197 01:06:50,416 --> 01:06:53,465 For example, if an anti-regime demonstrator 1198 01:06:53,555 --> 01:06:56,032 previously unknown to security services is arrested, 1199 01:06:56,262 --> 01:06:58,565 it'll be possible to go back in time 1200 01:06:58,615 --> 01:07:00,547 to scrutinize the demonstrator's phone conversations, 1201 01:07:00,597 --> 01:07:03,067 automobile travels, and the people he or she met 1202 01:07:03,137 --> 01:07:05,696 in the months, and even years leading up to the arrest. 1203 01:07:08,466 --> 01:07:12,819 The government is using the existence of terms of service to justify 1204 01:07:13,209 --> 01:07:15,090 the surveillance state that we know live in. 1205 01:07:15,570 --> 01:07:18,840 The messages are free to use, and most importantly, they're encrypted, 1206 01:07:18,880 --> 01:07:22,263 so the police can't actually get in there to uncrypt what happened. 1207 01:07:22,303 --> 01:07:25,565 That prompted calls to shut down the entire network. 1208 01:07:25,865 --> 01:07:29,719 (narrator) It's easy to justify using these technologies to stop a riot, 1209 01:07:29,769 --> 01:07:32,437 but shouldn't we be concerned when the government is able 1210 01:07:32,457 --> 01:07:35,563 to read our e-mails, text messages, phone calls, search history, 1211 01:07:35,603 --> 01:07:37,972 to track our movement and limit our free speech? 1212 01:07:38,942 --> 01:07:40,948 What crime did that 7th grade boy really commit? 1213 01:07:41,498 --> 01:07:43,773 Is having zombies to the Royal Wedding really so bad? 1214 01:07:44,223 --> 01:07:45,996 What about Milly's parents? 1215 01:07:46,297 --> 01:07:48,928 And what happen when these technologies are used to watch peaceful protesters, 1216 01:07:49,098 --> 01:07:52,642 like all the people who occupy Wall Street or the Tea Party folks? 1217 01:07:53,322 --> 01:07:56,830 What happens if the government doesn't like tents being set up? 1218 01:07:57,280 --> 01:08:03,220 (people shouting) Stop beating students! Stop beating students! 1219 01:08:05,180 --> 01:08:09,295 (narrator) Despite all of this, it was starting to seem like, so what? 1220 01:08:09,735 --> 01:08:12,306 So what if the government can acquire all of this information? 1221 01:08:12,566 --> 01:08:15,051 Maybe it's good they can keep the peace when riots are happening. 1222 01:08:15,332 --> 01:08:18,300 And besides, maybe it was already too late. 1223 01:08:26,465 --> 01:08:28,960 (interviewer) "Do you think privacy is dead?" 1224 01:08:33,979 --> 01:08:37,463 It means it's certainly dying... whether or not it... 1225 01:08:41,743 --> 01:08:45,579 For privacy to... I mean, privacy is going to remain dead 1226 01:08:45,649 --> 01:08:50,356 unless there's a fundamental shift in the dynamic by which our society is, 1227 01:08:50,796 --> 01:08:53,456 by which I mean the only really effective response 1228 01:08:53,506 --> 01:08:56,490 is to monitor, and to change the behavior 1229 01:08:57,029 --> 01:09:00,029 of the tendencies of the intelligence industry, 1230 01:09:00,129 --> 01:09:02,174 and law enforcement and all that, 1231 01:09:02,204 --> 01:09:03,665 and even companies. 1232 01:09:04,215 --> 01:09:06,014 And that's very, very unlikely. 1233 01:09:06,134 --> 01:09:09,228 I don't know exactly who the us is, but I'm very critical of us. 1234 01:09:10,268 --> 01:09:15,134 I think this is an area in which we have allowed ourselves to be smitten, 1235 01:09:15,955 --> 01:09:19,081 we want this technology to grow and grow, 1236 01:09:20,312 --> 01:09:23,210 and we don't want anything to rain on our parade. 1237 01:09:25,099 --> 01:09:33,787 And we've woken up to the privacy concerns in my view, at least 4 years too late. 1238 01:09:34,447 --> 01:09:36,836 (interviewer) "I mean, is really privacy dead?" 1239 01:09:37,055 --> 01:09:38,668 Yes, without question. 1240 01:09:39,258 --> 01:09:41,239 Without question... Yes, it's dead. 1241 01:09:41,669 --> 01:09:44,198 It's safe to work under the assumption that nothing is private. 1242 01:09:44,298 --> 01:09:47,573 Anything that's been digitized is not private, and that... 1243 01:09:49,563 --> 01:09:51,030 is terrifying. 1244 01:09:51,291 --> 01:09:53,498 So, when this become the size of a blood cell, 1245 01:09:53,578 --> 01:09:57,357 then I can just send them into my brain in my body, through the blood stream... 1246 01:09:57,477 --> 01:09:59,918 this will become quite ubiquitous... 1247 01:10:00,007 --> 01:10:02,756 And it really will be part of who we are, and people will say, 1248 01:10:02,956 --> 01:10:05,664 well, OK, that's really going to be a threshold to move beyond... 1249 01:10:05,824 --> 01:10:09,298 But I don't think so, it's a very smooth continuum from... 1250 01:10:09,978 --> 01:10:12,620 you know, when I was student and I had to take my bicycle 1251 01:10:12,780 --> 01:10:17,761 to get to the computer, to having it in my pocket, to having it in my body... 1252 01:10:18,491 --> 01:10:22,081 It's a convenient place to put it, I won't lose it that way. 1253 01:10:24,622 --> 01:10:27,157 But they say if you put a frog in a pot of water 1254 01:10:27,207 --> 01:10:29,212 and slowly turn on the heat, 1255 01:10:29,253 --> 01:10:31,991 the frog will just die because it doesn't realize that it's... 1256 01:10:32,040 --> 01:10:33,096 boiling. 1257 01:10:33,146 --> 01:10:36,816 And I think that's like anything else, 1258 01:10:36,866 --> 01:10:40,058 I think we're opting in a centimeter at a time, 1259 01:10:41,359 --> 01:10:43,404 and you know, pretty soon you're pretty far down the road, 1260 01:10:43,444 --> 01:10:46,530 you look behind you, you sort of wonder how you got where you were. 1261 01:10:48,570 --> 01:10:50,395 I think that's true. 1262 01:10:52,278 --> 01:10:55,098 It's just completely out of control. 1263 01:10:55,208 --> 01:10:59,071 I mean, the sky is the limit, you know. 1264 01:10:59,542 --> 01:11:01,770 They know everything about us now. 1265 01:11:02,693 --> 01:11:05,269 It's like, take someone who's in charge of laws, 1266 01:11:05,309 --> 01:11:07,091 having what's being done to American citizens, 1267 01:11:07,131 --> 01:11:09,204 done to their e-mail account, 1268 01:11:09,254 --> 01:11:11,227 - to their Facebook profile-- - Right, so that they pay attention to it. 1269 01:11:11,444 --> 01:11:13,941 All of these powerful institutions, 1270 01:11:15,591 --> 01:11:18,191 they are not subject to the same invasions of privacy 1271 01:11:18,251 --> 01:11:20,313 as of the rest of us are. 1272 01:11:20,533 --> 01:11:22,183 Eric Schmidt the CEO of Google once said: 1273 01:11:22,243 --> 01:11:24,960 If you have something that you don't want anybody to know, 1274 01:11:25,059 --> 01:11:27,325 maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place. 1275 01:11:28,114 --> 01:11:32,404 Then he got very angry when CNET, which is owned by CBS, 1276 01:11:32,444 --> 01:11:34,546 published a picture of his house. 1277 01:11:42,731 --> 01:11:45,288 When you ask Google about "Do not track", 1278 01:11:45,329 --> 01:11:48,260 they claim we have to understand how to define that 1279 01:11:48,300 --> 01:11:50,872 before we can implement any technology. 1280 01:11:51,462 --> 01:11:54,675 "Do not track" is pretty simple, it means, we don't want to be tracked. 1281 01:11:55,905 --> 01:11:57,985 The only reason Google doesn't understand it 1282 01:11:58,074 --> 01:12:00,810 is because Google doesn't want to implement it. 1283 01:12:26,129 --> 01:12:32,369 Unless someone comes and makes it no longer practical 1284 01:12:32,629 --> 01:12:35,068 for them to engage in that kind of activity, 1285 01:12:35,479 --> 01:12:39,577 pressure is put upon CEOs of the companies that are going to engage in it. 1286 01:12:46,296 --> 01:12:48,625 (typing sound) 1287 01:12:53,925 --> 01:12:55,263 It's dawn. 1288 01:12:56,854 --> 01:12:59,317 We're going by the Facebook campus right now. 1289 01:12:59,378 --> 01:13:01,676 Really, I have no idea about what to expect. 1290 01:13:02,966 --> 01:13:05,393 We'll now have breakfast. 1291 01:13:06,443 --> 01:13:08,173 [touching screen sound] 1292 01:13:12,658 --> 01:13:14,234 Zuckerberg... 1293 01:13:14,374 --> 01:13:16,999 They know that I checked in here too, so that's good, 1294 01:13:17,049 --> 01:13:19,314 he knows that I'm right next to his house. 1295 01:13:20,445 --> 01:13:23,027 See we have... here is the exact quote from Mark: 1296 01:13:24,177 --> 01:13:27,818 "Having two identities for yourself is an example of lack of integrity." 1297 01:13:29,127 --> 01:13:31,094 Lack of integrity. 1298 01:13:32,625 --> 01:13:35,223 They just did a knock up on his door so... 1299 01:13:35,349 --> 01:13:39,401 seems very likely that we might get a Mark Zuckerberg sighting today. 1300 01:13:41,582 --> 01:13:43,950 [clock ticking] 1301 01:13:44,914 --> 01:13:47,895 I mean you might be wrong, I don't see how it might actually happen. 1302 01:13:48,284 --> 01:13:50,707 Then, they might actually have a tunnel... 1303 01:13:51,816 --> 01:13:55,070 I see definite motion in the yard... ♪ [slow piano music] ♪ 1304 01:13:55,472 --> 01:13:57,795 Is it a dog? 1305 01:13:58,457 --> 01:14:00,609 Here we go! [inaudible] 1306 01:14:06,450 --> 01:14:08,234 (tire screeching) 1307 01:14:08,518 --> 01:14:10,059 (interviewer) Mr. Zuckerberg... 1308 01:14:10,129 --> 01:14:13,045 Hey, I'm working on a documentary... 1309 01:14:13,260 --> 01:14:14,776 Doing a little vlog here but... 1310 01:14:14,816 --> 01:14:16,856 wondering if I can ask you a couple of questions. 1311 01:14:17,071 --> 01:14:20,810 (Zuckerberg) No, I'm sorry, I have to go to work... 1312 01:14:21,040 --> 01:14:23,937 (interviewer) Just let me ask: Do you still think privacy is dead? 1313 01:14:24,276 --> 01:14:26,563 And, what are your real thoughts on privacy? 1314 01:14:27,248 --> 01:14:29,150 (Zuckerberg) Are you guys recording? 1315 01:14:29,304 --> 01:14:31,044 (interviewer) We are. 1316 01:14:31,720 --> 01:14:33,702 (Zuckerberg) Can you please not? 1317 01:14:33,992 --> 01:14:36,683 (interviewer) I can stop, yeah. All right. 1318 01:14:38,183 --> 01:14:41,518 (narrator) Mark Zuckerberg could ask me to please not record him. 1319 01:14:41,798 --> 01:14:43,985 So, we shut off the main camera. 1320 01:14:44,374 --> 01:14:46,442 But since Mark doesn't seem to mind storing our data 1321 01:14:46,513 --> 01:14:48,657 after we think it's been deleted, 1322 01:14:48,687 --> 01:14:50,890 this only seemed fair. 1323 01:14:51,449 --> 01:14:53,392 (Zuckerberg) Can you please stop? 1324 01:14:53,543 --> 01:14:56,344 (interviewer) I can stop, yeah. All right. 1325 01:14:56,394 --> 01:14:58,876 Can I come by the front desk and ask about setting up an interview? 1326 01:14:59,005 --> 01:15:02,745 (Zuckerberg) Yeah. We have a department that you can talk to people about that 1327 01:15:02,795 --> 01:15:05,420 (interviewer) I've tried going through it a few times, and I never hear back. 1328 01:15:05,771 --> 01:15:07,731 (narrator) There's a major difference here 1329 01:15:07,781 --> 01:15:09,983 Mark loosens up after he thinks we'd stopped recording. 1330 01:15:10,573 --> 01:15:13,200 And you see that? That right there... 1331 01:15:13,531 --> 01:15:14,945 That's a smile. 1332 01:15:15,454 --> 01:15:18,208 Mark Zuckerberg smiled at me, and you know why? 1333 01:15:18,669 --> 01:15:21,524 Because he thought I'd stopped recording, and he was relieved. 1334 01:15:23,433 --> 01:15:25,063 Imagine what a relief it would be, 1335 01:15:25,123 --> 01:15:28,955 if all these companies and the government stop recording everything we do, 1336 01:15:29,304 --> 01:15:31,789 if we could just make a simple request to them, 1337 01:15:31,879 --> 01:15:34,812 something that Mark Zuckerberg knows how to ask for. 1338 01:15:35,572 --> 01:15:37,578 Can you please not? 1339 01:15:37,648 --> 01:15:40,580 Can you please not record us, monitor us, and share information, 1340 01:15:40,750 --> 01:15:42,194 unless we ask first. 1341 01:15:43,294 --> 01:15:45,244 We need terms and conditions that are reasonable, 1342 01:15:45,304 --> 01:15:46,590 and we need privacy policies 1343 01:15:46,630 --> 01:15:49,122 to promote the most basic principles of our democracy, 1344 01:15:49,392 --> 01:15:51,361 rather than taking them away. 1345 01:15:52,301 --> 01:15:55,835 Or, as a young senator once said, back before he became President: 1346 01:15:56,154 --> 01:15:59,542 We need to find the way forward to make sure that we can stop terrorists 1347 01:15:59,653 --> 01:16:03,892 while protecting privacy and liberty of innocent Americans. 1348 01:16:04,281 --> 01:16:07,424 We have to find a way to give the President the power he needs 1349 01:16:07,454 --> 01:16:11,410 to protect us, while making sure that he doesn't abuse that power. 1350 01:16:11,450 --> 01:16:13,714 And that simple principle, 1351 01:16:14,373 --> 01:16:17,646 that there's somebody watching the watcher 1352 01:16:17,896 --> 01:16:22,736 whether that's on the issue of freedom of the press, 1353 01:16:22,796 --> 01:16:25,439 or it's an issue of wireless wiretaps, 1354 01:16:25,640 --> 01:16:28,365 that simple principle is one that we can't give up, 1355 01:16:28,405 --> 01:16:30,020 and we don't have to give up. 1356 01:16:30,711 --> 01:16:33,478 (narrator) Well, Mr. President, we are watching, 1357 01:16:34,118 --> 01:16:38,646 and I guess we have to ask ourselves one simple question: 1358 01:16:40,209 --> 01:16:42,030 Do we agree? 1359 01:16:58,571 --> 01:17:01,675 ♪ (music) ♪ 1360 01:17:35,249 --> 01:17:39,475 Washington is caught in its very own episode of Spy vs. Spy. 1361 01:17:39,505 --> 01:17:42,598 The tactics once employed by top intelligence gathering teams like the CIA, 1362 01:17:42,659 --> 01:17:45,953 sifting through IP addresses, e-mails and fake dropboxes, 1363 01:17:45,993 --> 01:17:49,751 had now been turned against the intelligence community's top official. 1364 01:17:55,285 --> 01:17:58,064 (anchorman) The FBI uncovered evidence of an affair 1365 01:17:58,104 --> 01:18:00,836 between Petraeus and his biographer, Paula Broadwell. 1366 01:18:00,956 --> 01:18:05,277 That's right. Petraeus had an affair with the author of his falling biography 1367 01:18:05,307 --> 01:18:06,760 "All In". 1368 01:18:12,764 --> 01:18:15,028 These did not implicate criminal activities, 1369 01:18:15,088 --> 01:18:17,188 these did not implicate national security, 1370 01:18:17,328 --> 01:18:19,715 these were not a threat to David Petraeus the person, 1371 01:18:20,014 --> 01:18:24,879 or to General Petraeus, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1372 01:18:25,568 --> 01:18:28,230 Those are not my words, those are the FBI's words. 1373 01:18:36,183 --> 01:18:39,367 But instead of actually sending those e-mails, in many cases, 1374 01:18:39,417 --> 01:18:42,915 they wrote them as drafts in a Gmail account they both had access to, 1375 01:18:42,965 --> 01:18:45,698 and that way, they can both log on and check the draft folder, 1376 01:18:45,739 --> 01:18:47,765 never actually having to hit 'Send.' 1377 01:18:48,054 --> 01:18:50,497 It was very embarrassing for the Obama's administration 1378 01:18:50,547 --> 01:18:52,982 and for its National Security Command. 1379 01:18:59,518 --> 01:19:03,238 It's troubling because there are laws that the FBI has to follow, 1380 01:19:03,308 --> 01:19:07,456 and he has the right to be protected from an unwarranted, 1381 01:19:07,516 --> 01:19:09,792 unjustified investigation by the FBI or anyone. 1382 01:19:09,872 --> 01:19:11,791 People don't really know how they're being monitored, 1383 01:19:11,831 --> 01:19:13,861 and they think, "Hey, if it's working, 1384 01:19:13,891 --> 01:19:17,216 if we keep stopping another 9/11, then it's... then it's, quote, worth it." 1385 01:19:40,312 --> 01:19:47,087 The greatest fear that I have regarding the outcome for America 1386 01:19:47,757 --> 01:19:50,689 of these disclosures is that nothing will change. 121132

Can't find what you're looking for?
Get subtitles in any language from opensubtitles.com, and translate them here.