All language subtitles for 29-02-2023

Does the Russian Armed Forces have
the ability to attack the Chernihiv,

Sumy, and Kharkiv regions from their territory?

The question has become quite relevant in
recent days in the context of discussions

of the offensive capabilities
of the Russian Armed Forces and,

in general, the threat of opening a second front.

Well, everything is quite simple.

As of today, up to 25 battalion tactical
groups (hereinafter simply groups) with

a total strength of about 17,000 people
are concentrated along the border with

Ukraine in the Kursk, Bryansk,
and Belgorod regions of Russia.

These groups are stretched
along the border and do not

represent a concentration in one location-sector.

The total equipment of these groups
by combat vehicles is as follows:

Tanks - about 100 instead of the standard 275;

Armored vehicles - just over
360 instead of the standard 825;

Barrel artillery - 200
instead of the standard 300;

Multiple rocket launchers - 30
instead of the standard 300 !!!

As we can see, the standard equipment of these
groups sometimes does not reach 50% or more!

I want to draw special attention to this point
because this quantitative discrepancy vividly

demonstrates the level of equipment shortage
in the units of the Russian Armed Forces and

the inability of the occupiers' command to
quickly and effectively solve this problem.

The next point is the length of the front. The
Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv regions are more

than 700 km of the common border with Russia, and
the 25 groups physically cannot cover this front.

Given the current quality of Russian units,
their professional composition and equipment,

their functionality corresponds
to 3 groups per 1 km of the front.

In other words, 25 groups can cover
a maximum of 8 km of the front,

which corresponds to a narrow-focused offensive,

for example, along the E-105 highway to Kharkiv
or N-07 to Sumy. But for this, all this defective

and under-equipped mass must be concentrated
in one location, exposing the entire border.

That is, all the forces that are now
concentrated along the border are,

firstly, deterrent-defensive, secondly, limiting
the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,

and thirdly, an element of
provocations and sabotage,

in particular, for terrorist artillery
shelling of Ukrainian territory.

That is precisely why everything is quite simple.

Offensives from the Kursk, Bryansk, and
Belgorod regions towards Chernihiv, Sumy,

and Kharkiv should not be expected. Infiltration
of sabotage-reconnaissance groups - yes.

Suicidal attempts to seize border
villages - yes. But not more than that.

Currently, there's a lot of discussion
about the news from the "far north of

Westeros" about a resident of the Omsk
region who tragically passed away while

participating in a blini-eating competition.
It's important to note that she was experiencing

difficulty breathing and had turned blue, yet
continued to eat despite the obvious danger.

This is like describing briefly the course
of a so-called "special military operation".

Life and its unexpected turns
are truly the best storyteller.