All language subtitles for 0023-0011

The situation in the southern bridgehead continues
to deteriorate for the Russian occupation troops.

First, they are unable to fully manage
forward units due to serious risks to

headquarters and command posts in the
near-fire zone. This forces the Russian

troops to place these facilities, to put it
mildly, outside the main operational zone,

which has its own negative impact on the
effectiveness of command and control.

Second, logistics continue to be wanting, and the
supply system, despite the 24/7 reverse loading of

the Crimean Bridge railway artery, does not fully
support this group of troops. To date, they can

compensate for average statistical losses, but
cannot restore units to a fighting condition.

Thirdly, as Ukraine’s armed forces are
being strengthened on the right bank,

they are expanding their capacity to
exert fire pressure on the left bank.

In other words, the high-risk zone, let's call it
that, for Russian troops is expanding every day.

And this, in turn, has an additional impact
on the management and support system.

I would like to note that similar
conditions on the right bank have

been formed by the armed forces of
Ukraine for the occupiers for months.

On the left bank, after the flight of Russian
troops from the right bank, they have already

been formed at the initial level and with every
day only speeds up their full-scale creation.

Conclusions - corresponding. All processes on the
left bank will flow much faster than on the right.

And this is already clearly visible.

At the same time, British Intelligence
said that the Swatov direction is

probably the most vulnerable to the
Russian armed forces at the moment.

The occupiers continue to build fortifications,

but they may be filled with mostly ill-trained
mobilized ones. For successful defensive and

offensive operations, the Russian command
lacks both qualified soldiers and equipment.

The Dutch defense analytics
and war research website Oryx,

which collects information from open sources, has
so far recorded more than 8 thousand captured,

damaged or destroyed military equipment of
the occupants. The number of tanks lost by

the Russian Armed Forces, confirmed
by visual evidence, exceeded 1,500.

Naturally, this is the lowest bar of
losses, and the real figures are higher.

Ukraine's documented losses are still,

as at the beginning of the war, about
3.5 times lower than Russian losses.