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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:00,030 --> 00:00:02,399 hi everybody let's in this video look at 2 00:00:02,399 --> 00:00:04,920 oligopoly in detail focusing on the 3 00:00:04,920 --> 00:00:07,379 Kingdom man curve model of studying 4 00:00:07,379 --> 00:00:09,360 oligopoly we're gonna look at it in the 5 00:00:09,360 --> 00:00:10,950 same way as always we're gonna start 6 00:00:10,950 --> 00:00:12,900 with characteristics were then gonna go 7 00:00:12,900 --> 00:00:15,150 to a king demand curve diagram then 8 00:00:15,150 --> 00:00:16,590 we're gonna look at the conclusions that 9 00:00:16,590 --> 00:00:18,690 we can take from this this is part one 10 00:00:18,690 --> 00:00:20,939 of our oligopoly study we can also use 11 00:00:20,939 --> 00:00:23,400 game theory to map oligopoly behavior 12 00:00:23,400 --> 00:00:25,109 that's going to be the next video so 13 00:00:25,109 --> 00:00:27,570 stay tuned for that after this let's go 14 00:00:27,570 --> 00:00:29,519 straight into the characteristics that 15 00:00:29,519 --> 00:00:32,250 define oligopoly a very very realistic 16 00:00:32,250 --> 00:00:34,620 market structure here well Oleg means 17 00:00:34,620 --> 00:00:36,780 few so we can say that there are a few 18 00:00:36,780 --> 00:00:38,760 firms that dominate the market being 19 00:00:38,760 --> 00:00:40,770 more precise than that we can say that 20 00:00:40,770 --> 00:00:43,350 there is a high concentration ratio what 21 00:00:43,350 --> 00:00:44,850 does that mean well we normally say as 22 00:00:44,850 --> 00:00:47,760 economists no more than seven firms with 23 00:00:47,760 --> 00:00:50,340 collectively around 70% market share 24 00:00:50,340 --> 00:00:52,199 that's kind of how we define an 25 00:00:52,199 --> 00:00:54,090 oligopoly these firms will have 26 00:00:54,090 --> 00:00:56,129 differentiated goods unique goods which 27 00:00:56,129 --> 00:00:58,920 means that they are price makers here we 28 00:00:58,920 --> 00:01:00,690 say there are high barriers to entry and 29 00:01:00,690 --> 00:01:03,270 exit an oligopolistic markets the major 30 00:01:03,270 --> 00:01:05,220 barriers to entry startup costs 31 00:01:05,220 --> 00:01:07,830 economies of scale sunk costs brand 32 00:01:07,830 --> 00:01:11,250 loyalty they tend to be quite strong we 33 00:01:11,250 --> 00:01:13,470 say that in oligopolistic markets there 34 00:01:13,470 --> 00:01:16,740 is interdependence this is a defining 35 00:01:16,740 --> 00:01:19,350 feature of an oligopoly market along 36 00:01:19,350 --> 00:01:20,580 with number one probably the most 37 00:01:20,580 --> 00:01:22,950 important characteristic here what is 38 00:01:22,950 --> 00:01:24,720 interdependence interdependence means 39 00:01:24,720 --> 00:01:27,210 that firms don't make decisions on their 40 00:01:27,210 --> 00:01:30,840 own independently no they make their 41 00:01:30,840 --> 00:01:33,450 choices they make decisions based on the 42 00:01:33,450 --> 00:01:36,450 actions and all the reactions of rival 43 00:01:36,450 --> 00:01:38,340 firms so their owners made decisions 44 00:01:38,340 --> 00:01:40,290 independently on their own they think 45 00:01:40,290 --> 00:01:42,090 about what their rivals are going to do 46 00:01:42,090 --> 00:01:44,399 they think about rival firms first and 47 00:01:44,399 --> 00:01:45,509 then make decisions 48 00:01:45,509 --> 00:01:47,520 so that's interdependence firms make 49 00:01:47,520 --> 00:01:49,619 decisions based on the actions and or 50 00:01:49,619 --> 00:01:52,140 reactions of rival firms very important 51 00:01:52,140 --> 00:01:53,909 characteristic and because of that we 52 00:01:53,909 --> 00:01:55,799 often see price rigidity we're going to 53 00:01:55,799 --> 00:01:57,990 study how in a second using the kingdom 54 00:01:57,990 --> 00:02:00,390 anchor model so if there isn't much 55 00:02:00,390 --> 00:02:02,610 competition on price prices tend to be 56 00:02:02,610 --> 00:02:04,680 sticky or rigid we see a lot of 57 00:02:04,680 --> 00:02:06,390 non-price competition therefore 58 00:02:06,390 --> 00:02:08,429 competition based on branding 59 00:02:08,429 --> 00:02:10,860 advertising quality of product quality 60 00:02:10,860 --> 00:02:12,480 of service that kind of 61 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:15,300 and also because of interdependence 62 00:02:15,300 --> 00:02:17,970 profit maximization is not necessarily 63 00:02:17,970 --> 00:02:21,390 here the sole objective of firms firms 64 00:02:21,390 --> 00:02:23,459 don't make decisions independently they 65 00:02:23,459 --> 00:02:25,050 always think about what their rivals are 66 00:02:25,050 --> 00:02:26,670 doing what their rivals are going to do 67 00:02:26,670 --> 00:02:28,680 and if you think about oligopoly as a 68 00:02:28,680 --> 00:02:31,430 dog fight a dog fight for market share 69 00:02:31,430 --> 00:02:34,500 firms are very close to having control 70 00:02:34,500 --> 00:02:37,080 over the market monopoly power in the 71 00:02:37,080 --> 00:02:38,760 market and therefore anything that they 72 00:02:38,760 --> 00:02:40,170 can do that's going to give them that 73 00:02:40,170 --> 00:02:42,239 power they are going to do if that means 74 00:02:42,239 --> 00:02:44,340 profit maximization is the best then by 75 00:02:44,340 --> 00:02:45,630 all means but if it means a different 76 00:02:45,630 --> 00:02:47,640 objective is better then they'll pursue 77 00:02:47,640 --> 00:02:50,099 that so it makes knowing the objective 78 00:02:50,099 --> 00:02:51,870 very difficult in truth we don't know 79 00:02:51,870 --> 00:02:53,549 what the objective of firms are in 80 00:02:53,549 --> 00:02:54,390 oligopoly 81 00:02:54,390 --> 00:02:56,130 therefore we say that profit max is not 82 00:02:56,130 --> 00:02:58,140 always the sole objective you think that 83 00:02:58,140 --> 00:02:59,549 this is a dogfight for market share 84 00:02:59,549 --> 00:03:02,130 whatever objective allows the firm to 85 00:03:02,130 --> 00:03:03,959 get there is what the objective a firm 86 00:03:03,959 --> 00:03:05,940 is going to be so understanding these 87 00:03:05,940 --> 00:03:07,230 characteristics can we look at any 88 00:03:07,230 --> 00:03:08,730 real-life examples yeah there are some 89 00:03:08,730 --> 00:03:10,560 really good ones let's look at global 90 00:03:10,560 --> 00:03:13,170 oligopoly examples and we can take the 91 00:03:13,170 --> 00:03:15,420 global soft drink industry absolutely a 92 00:03:15,420 --> 00:03:17,940 duopoly between coca-cola and Pepsi the 93 00:03:17,940 --> 00:03:19,549 global car industry is a good example 94 00:03:19,549 --> 00:03:23,370 OPEC is a legal oligopoly very good 95 00:03:23,370 --> 00:03:25,620 example right the Petroleum Exporting 96 00:03:25,620 --> 00:03:28,980 Countries here OPEC but we take the UK 97 00:03:28,980 --> 00:03:30,600 there are some great examples of the UK 98 00:03:30,600 --> 00:03:33,170 oligopoly the UK supermarket industry 99 00:03:33,170 --> 00:03:36,359 the UK energy industry the UK 100 00:03:36,359 --> 00:03:39,389 supermarket fuel providers a UK bus 101 00:03:39,389 --> 00:03:42,389 market UK airline market whether a short 102 00:03:42,389 --> 00:03:43,889 haul or long-haul Airlines some 103 00:03:43,889 --> 00:03:45,569 brilliant examples of oligopoly and the 104 00:03:45,569 --> 00:03:48,420 characteristics will fit here but can we 105 00:03:48,420 --> 00:03:50,250 map oligopoly behavior due to 106 00:03:50,250 --> 00:03:52,680 independence it's very difficult but one 107 00:03:52,680 --> 00:03:54,989 tool to help us is the Kingdom and curve 108 00:03:54,989 --> 00:03:56,519 model here what can we learn from this 109 00:03:56,519 --> 00:03:58,349 the king demand curve can nicely 110 00:03:58,349 --> 00:04:01,349 illustrate interdependence and can lead 111 00:04:01,349 --> 00:04:03,269 us to our conclusion of price rigidity 112 00:04:03,269 --> 00:04:05,849 in two ways the first way to use king 113 00:04:05,849 --> 00:04:08,220 demand curve is to understand that firms 114 00:04:08,220 --> 00:04:10,230 don't want to change their price let's 115 00:04:10,230 --> 00:04:12,780 understand how here so the price in the 116 00:04:12,780 --> 00:04:14,940 market is currently at p1 it is settled 117 00:04:14,940 --> 00:04:18,060 there and the theory goes that around p1 118 00:04:18,060 --> 00:04:20,339 there are differing elasticity's of 119 00:04:20,339 --> 00:04:22,950 demand we can see that above p1 there is 120 00:04:22,950 --> 00:04:24,900 a price elastic demand curve 121 00:04:24,900 --> 00:04:26,940 and we can see that below p1 there is a 122 00:04:26,940 --> 00:04:29,850 price inelastic demand curve differing 123 00:04:29,850 --> 00:04:32,130 price elasticities of demand around the 124 00:04:32,130 --> 00:04:34,560 price in the market of p1 therefore ax 125 00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:36,150 makes no sense for a firm to change 126 00:04:36,150 --> 00:04:37,800 their price let's take an example and 127 00:04:37,800 --> 00:04:40,380 say if firm raises their price from p1 128 00:04:40,380 --> 00:04:43,290 to p2 we can see here that quantity 129 00:04:43,290 --> 00:04:44,880 demanded is going to decrease 130 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:47,820 but decrease proportionately more than 131 00:04:47,820 --> 00:04:50,490 the increase in price why is that as a 132 00:04:50,490 --> 00:04:52,710 firm moves on to the price elastic part 133 00:04:52,710 --> 00:04:53,520 of the demand curve 134 00:04:53,520 --> 00:04:55,710 that's because of interdependence other 135 00:04:55,710 --> 00:04:57,600 firms will not follow this price rise 136 00:04:57,600 --> 00:05:00,780 looking to gain market share other firms 137 00:05:00,780 --> 00:05:02,400 are going to keep that price at p1 and 138 00:05:02,400 --> 00:05:04,530 undercut this firm so the firm has 139 00:05:04,530 --> 00:05:06,060 raised their price is going to suffer 140 00:05:06,060 --> 00:05:07,470 all the other firms in the market will 141 00:05:07,470 --> 00:05:09,690 keep their price at p1 the man is gonna 142 00:05:09,690 --> 00:05:11,550 drop off significantly and as a result 143 00:05:11,550 --> 00:05:14,190 market share is gonna decrease total 144 00:05:14,190 --> 00:05:15,870 revenue is going to decrease for this 145 00:05:15,870 --> 00:05:18,090 firm what a stupid decision when 146 00:05:18,090 --> 00:05:20,070 oligopoly is all about a dogfight for 147 00:05:20,070 --> 00:05:22,500 market share so raising price above p1 148 00:05:22,500 --> 00:05:24,570 makes absolutely no sense because of 149 00:05:24,570 --> 00:05:26,490 interdependence and how other firms will 150 00:05:26,490 --> 00:05:29,580 react what about reducing price let's 151 00:05:29,580 --> 00:05:31,620 say this firm goes for a big decrease in 152 00:05:31,620 --> 00:05:35,430 price from p1 to p3 here big decrease in 153 00:05:35,430 --> 00:05:37,350 price well we can see because of the law 154 00:05:37,350 --> 00:05:38,479 of demand demand is going to increase 155 00:05:38,479 --> 00:05:42,599 from q1 to q3 but proportionately less 156 00:05:42,599 --> 00:05:44,580 than the reduction in price and that's 157 00:05:44,580 --> 00:05:47,099 clear to see here as this firm now moves 158 00:05:47,099 --> 00:05:49,590 on to the price inelastic portion of the 159 00:05:49,590 --> 00:05:52,349 demand curve why is that why is the 160 00:05:52,349 --> 00:05:54,720 proportional increase in quantity 161 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:56,099 demanded going to be less than the fall 162 00:05:56,099 --> 00:05:58,349 in price well that's because of other 163 00:05:58,349 --> 00:05:59,760 firms and how they're going to react 164 00:05:59,760 --> 00:06:01,919 other firms are going to follow looking 165 00:06:01,919 --> 00:06:03,630 to protect their market share they're 166 00:06:03,630 --> 00:06:05,580 going to follow and get into a price war 167 00:06:05,580 --> 00:06:08,370 with this firm as a result of that total 168 00:06:08,370 --> 00:06:09,539 revenue is going to decrease 169 00:06:09,539 --> 00:06:11,700 remember if we reduce price and demand 170 00:06:11,700 --> 00:06:13,919 as price inelastic total revenue is 171 00:06:13,919 --> 00:06:16,229 going to fall and net overtime there is 172 00:06:16,229 --> 00:06:18,180 going to be no change in market share so 173 00:06:18,180 --> 00:06:20,639 even a price reduction is not in the 174 00:06:20,639 --> 00:06:22,620 best interest of the firm as they move 175 00:06:22,620 --> 00:06:24,570 on to the price inelastic portion of the 176 00:06:24,570 --> 00:06:27,389 demand curve here so it's clear from the 177 00:06:27,389 --> 00:06:29,760 very basic kingdom--and curve model that 178 00:06:29,760 --> 00:06:31,560 firms don't want to change their price 179 00:06:31,560 --> 00:06:33,390 raising price they'll lose market share 180 00:06:33,390 --> 00:06:35,729 and reducing price they won't gain 181 00:06:35,729 --> 00:06:36,249 anymore 182 00:06:36,249 --> 00:06:37,569 you've shown the long run they're going 183 00:06:37,569 --> 00:06:40,389 to lose revenue in both cases here so 184 00:06:40,389 --> 00:06:42,309 changing price altering price from p1 185 00:06:42,309 --> 00:06:44,829 makes no sense for the firm because of 186 00:06:44,829 --> 00:06:46,869 interdependence therefore there is an 187 00:06:46,869 --> 00:06:48,729 argument a price rigidity in oligopoly 188 00:06:48,729 --> 00:06:50,409 but there is another way we can use 189 00:06:50,409 --> 00:06:51,879 Kingdom and cope we can enhance him 190 00:06:51,879 --> 00:06:54,129 understand why firms don't need to 191 00:06:54,129 --> 00:06:56,409 change their price and that comes from 192 00:06:56,409 --> 00:06:58,899 drawing the marginal revenue curve the 193 00:06:58,899 --> 00:07:00,399 marginal revenue curve is going to look 194 00:07:00,399 --> 00:07:03,009 something like this remember mr is 195 00:07:03,009 --> 00:07:05,499 always twice as steep as a are so twice 196 00:07:05,499 --> 00:07:07,149 as steep there but then it's going to 197 00:07:07,149 --> 00:07:09,939 possess a vertical gap before being 198 00:07:09,939 --> 00:07:12,519 twice as steep as the second part of the 199 00:07:12,519 --> 00:07:15,039 AR curve join everything together we 200 00:07:15,039 --> 00:07:16,569 have an mr curve that looks like that 201 00:07:16,569 --> 00:07:19,659 you don't need to understand why the mr 202 00:07:19,659 --> 00:07:21,219 curve has got a vertical gap in it but 203 00:07:21,219 --> 00:07:22,869 if you want to know just click on this 204 00:07:22,869 --> 00:07:24,789 link I've explained it why there is a 205 00:07:24,789 --> 00:07:26,559 vertical gap when we draw the mr curve 206 00:07:26,559 --> 00:07:28,329 in the kingdom anchor model you can 207 00:07:28,329 --> 00:07:30,189 understand it there but that's what it 208 00:07:30,189 --> 00:07:31,929 looks like the mr curve with a vertical 209 00:07:31,929 --> 00:07:34,569 gap in it and the idea is that if costs 210 00:07:34,569 --> 00:07:36,909 change within this gap so let's say 211 00:07:36,909 --> 00:07:38,469 costs increase we're going to draw 212 00:07:38,469 --> 00:07:39,519 marginal cost 213 00:07:39,519 --> 00:07:44,110 mc1 and cost to increase to MC - the 214 00:07:44,110 --> 00:07:46,659 idea is as long as costs change within 215 00:07:46,659 --> 00:07:49,539 this vertical gap if the oligopolist is 216 00:07:49,539 --> 00:07:51,669 a profit maximize their producing where 217 00:07:51,669 --> 00:07:55,689 MC equals mr in any case they are going 218 00:07:55,689 --> 00:07:57,489 to be charging a price of p1 and 219 00:07:57,489 --> 00:07:58,839 understand that by looking at this 220 00:07:58,839 --> 00:08:01,029 diagram so if the oligopolist is a 221 00:08:01,029 --> 00:08:03,549 profit maximizer producing where MC 222 00:08:03,549 --> 00:08:07,419 equals mr in both cases MC equals mr is 223 00:08:07,419 --> 00:08:09,249 going to give us a quantity here at q1 224 00:08:09,249 --> 00:08:11,379 remembering that we read the price of 225 00:08:11,379 --> 00:08:14,319 the AR curve as long as quantities at q1 226 00:08:14,319 --> 00:08:16,059 the price is always going to be reading 227 00:08:16,059 --> 00:08:19,529 off the AR curve p1 so we can understand 228 00:08:19,529 --> 00:08:22,239 that because there is a vertical gap in 229 00:08:22,239 --> 00:08:25,059 the mr curve here as long as costs 230 00:08:25,059 --> 00:08:27,610 change within this vertical gap a profit 231 00:08:27,610 --> 00:08:29,559 maximizing oligopolist producing where 232 00:08:29,559 --> 00:08:32,019 MC equals mr will always charge a price 233 00:08:32,019 --> 00:08:35,198 of p1 IE firms don't need to change 234 00:08:35,198 --> 00:08:37,509 their price potentially if costs were to 235 00:08:37,509 --> 00:08:39,009 change within this vertical gap this is 236 00:08:39,009 --> 00:08:41,198 a very theoretical idea but you can see 237 00:08:41,198 --> 00:08:42,818 how we can extend the kingdom anchor 238 00:08:42,818 --> 00:08:45,250 model to give us a second reason behind 239 00:08:45,250 --> 00:08:47,980 price rigidity that's fantastic now 240 00:08:47,980 --> 00:08:50,200 let's understand sum up all the 241 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:51,550 conclusions we can get from the kingdom 242 00:08:51,550 --> 00:08:53,920 anchor model conclusion number one is 243 00:08:53,920 --> 00:08:55,630 that even though it doesn't make any 244 00:08:55,630 --> 00:08:57,760 sense for a firm to do so that could 245 00:08:57,760 --> 00:08:59,530 well be price competition in an 246 00:08:59,530 --> 00:09:01,540 oligopoly market we've said that raising 247 00:09:01,540 --> 00:09:03,580 price or reducing price doesn't make 248 00:09:03,580 --> 00:09:06,310 sense but first may still try and reduce 249 00:09:06,310 --> 00:09:08,530 price in order to gain market share to 250 00:09:08,530 --> 00:09:10,690 out-compete rivals known as a price war 251 00:09:10,690 --> 00:09:12,340 so even though we said it doesn't make 252 00:09:12,340 --> 00:09:13,660 sense it doesn't mean out there in the 253 00:09:13,660 --> 00:09:15,730 real world firms don't give it a go we 254 00:09:15,730 --> 00:09:18,190 look at a supermarket providers in the 255 00:09:18,190 --> 00:09:20,320 UK is a good example you see a lot of 256 00:09:20,320 --> 00:09:21,970 price wars and price competition there 257 00:09:21,970 --> 00:09:24,270 and also short haul airlines in the UK 258 00:09:24,270 --> 00:09:26,110 competition is based around reducing 259 00:09:26,110 --> 00:09:29,140 price and price wars but the second 260 00:09:29,140 --> 00:09:30,280 conclusion which is probably more 261 00:09:30,280 --> 00:09:31,870 logical here is that we'll see a lot of 262 00:09:31,870 --> 00:09:34,330 non-price competition if we agree that 263 00:09:34,330 --> 00:09:36,460 prices tend to stay sticky and rigid at 264 00:09:36,460 --> 00:09:38,350 p1 it makes sense for there to be more 265 00:09:38,350 --> 00:09:40,480 than non-price competition like we see 266 00:09:40,480 --> 00:09:42,070 with the global soft drink industry as 267 00:09:42,070 --> 00:09:44,140 an example competition on branding 268 00:09:44,140 --> 00:09:46,780 advertising and quality absolutely but 269 00:09:46,780 --> 00:09:47,770 also we can see here that 270 00:09:47,770 --> 00:09:50,200 interdependence is annoying right 271 00:09:50,200 --> 00:09:52,120 interdependence is frustrating it means 272 00:09:52,120 --> 00:09:54,520 you can't see much price competition it 273 00:09:54,520 --> 00:09:56,170 means firms are always kind of looking 274 00:09:56,170 --> 00:09:57,940 at what their rivals are doing how their 275 00:09:57,940 --> 00:09:59,890 rivals are going to react etc and that's 276 00:09:59,890 --> 00:10:02,040 frustrating so there is a very strong 277 00:10:02,040 --> 00:10:04,600 temptation in oligopoly to break into 278 00:10:04,600 --> 00:10:06,700 the pendants and to collude together not 279 00:10:06,700 --> 00:10:08,980 have to worry about how rivals are going 280 00:10:08,980 --> 00:10:10,630 to react I'm worrying about what to do 281 00:10:10,630 --> 00:10:13,180 with your price if you're colluding you 282 00:10:13,180 --> 00:10:15,370 can act like a monopoly fix prices and 283 00:10:15,370 --> 00:10:16,750 make very high profit so there is that 284 00:10:16,750 --> 00:10:18,880 very strong temptation as well to ditch 285 00:10:18,880 --> 00:10:21,370 into dependence collude and fixed prices 286 00:10:21,370 --> 00:10:23,410 are made very high profits this is only 287 00:10:23,410 --> 00:10:24,910 half the story we need to also 288 00:10:24,910 --> 00:10:27,280 understand how we can use game theory to 289 00:10:27,280 --> 00:10:29,620 map oligopoly behavior stay tuned for 290 00:10:29,620 --> 00:10:32,150 that video next thanks for watching guys 291 00:10:32,150 --> 00:10:40,480 [Music] 21042

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