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[atmospheric music plays]
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[narrator] Spies conduct surveillance
to learn their enemies' secrets.
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The benefit of bugging your enemies
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is to obtain information
that you can use and pass on.
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[narrator] To do this, spies use stealth
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and the most cutting-edge
surveillance technology.
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There were hundreds of microphones
put in the exterior walls of the building.
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The only way to make that building secure
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was to chop off the top three floors
and throw it away.
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[narrator] When intelligence agencies
don't have access, they get creative.
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The idea to create a microphone
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inside a bullet,
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and actually fire it from a gun
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and it would be able to pick up
communications and transmit it out.
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[intense music playing]
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[narrator] And when they need
to track you, they can.
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[man] You can't go anywhere
and do anything
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without leaving a trail
or a sort of digital dust
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of who you are and where you've been.
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[theme music playing]
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[narrator] Rulers, governments,
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lovers, and corporations
have been doing it for centuries.
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Spying to gain information,
assess potential threats,
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stop attacks and gain the upper hand.
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Today, intelligence agencies
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carry out espionage operations
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using cutting-edge surveillance devices,
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from tiny eavesdropping microphones
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to subminiature video cameras
and drone technology.
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For a spy to have an idea
of what an enemy is doing,
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there is perhaps no better way than
if the spy could eavesdrop somehow.
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Good surveillance is always dependent
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on the best available technology.
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So, if we look back a hundred years ago
to World War I,
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the height of aerial audio surveillance
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was giant microphones
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that could hear, directionally,
planes coming from miles away.
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That was the best technology
that was available at the time.
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Today, cameras can spot a plane
at 50 miles away.
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[atmospheric music plays]
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[narrator] The use of bugs
became a common technique
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used for surveillance
by intelligence agencies
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in the 1950s and '60s,
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and usually combined a miniature
radio transmitter with a microphone
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that could also be operated on batteries.
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The small size of the transmitter
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and the ability to easily conceal
in various objects
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made it a "go-to" for spies.
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One creative example for surveillance
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was developed by the STB,
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Czechoslovakia's intelligence agency,
in the 1970s.
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Their target: the US ambassador
and his imported shoes.
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When the shoes arrived,
the STB intercepted them
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and modified them
with an eavesdropping device.
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He had a maid who took care
of all of his clothes,
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that did the pressing,
the polishing the shoes and all that,
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then when she gave him the shoes
in the morning, she would pull the pin out
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and the batteries would start
the transmitter running again.
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Well, he wore those shoes to the office,
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and some people who were using radios,
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listening for potential bugs
in the embassy,
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detected his voice.
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[narrator] A counter-surveillance team
detected a signal
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coming from the ambassador
as he moved around the embassy grounds.
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It soon became clear that the ambassador
was actually wearing a listening device.
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[Parrack]
So, in the process of taking
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various articles of clothing off of him,
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they finally found that someone
had modified the heel of the shoe
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to contain a transmitter
and a battery pack.
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And that's a case
of a low-tech transmitter, uh…
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that could be picked up
by a normal radio receiver,
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where you could hear the voice
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and identify who it was and where it was.
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[narrator] This wasn't the first time
a US ambassador
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had been the target
of covert surveillance.
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An early listening device called
the Passive Cavity Resonator,
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also known as "the thing,"
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was invented for the KGB
by Leon Theremin,
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the famous musician
and Russian scientist, in 1945.
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It contained no electrical parts
and is still marveled at today.
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To work, a signal emitter would beam
an ultra-high-frequency radio signal
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to an antenna inside
the Passive Cavity Resonator,
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pick up conversations,
then beam them back to a receiver.
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[Gerald B. Richards]
Passive Cavity Resonator is basically
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a device that will only be activated,
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uh, upon some radio wave or microwave.
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Since it's not transmitting anything,
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you wouldn't pick it up
under normal circumstances.
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[narrator] In August 1945,
US ambassador to Russia, Averell Harriman,
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received one hidden inside a special gift.
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They were Russian versions of Boy Scouts,
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presented the US ambassador
a magnificent carved wooden statue
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of the Great Seal of the United States.
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And he proudly hung it up on a wall
on back of his desk.
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Uh, and every time the Russians
would burst a specific microwave,
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right through the wall
from another building,
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it would turn, basically turn it on,
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and anything you discussed
in his office, they could hear.
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[Melton] And for seven years,
every word in his office
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could be recovered
from the Russian listening post
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across the street.
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[Parrack] And it was only found
by accident.
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When they took the seal apart, there was
a disc in it about the size of a quarter,
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about a half inch thick,
that was the microphone.
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And there was a metal rod
about a foot long
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that was connected to the microphone,
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that ran down the back of the plaque
in the eagle.
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That rod was an antenna.
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From across the street,
the Russians transmitted a radio signal.
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The antenna picked up that signal
in his residence.
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It was strong enough to power
the microphone
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and transmit the voice back
on a different frequency.
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Using radio bugs against ambassadors
is not something new.
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[narrator] The Russian
intelligence agencies are masters
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in the art of surveillance and have an
ongoing and pervasive system in place
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to collect intelligence against the US.
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Throughout the 1960s and '70s,
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microphones were found in various places
inside the US Embassy.
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Every time one was discovered,
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the KGB got more creative
with where they'd hide them.
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Some typewriters were found modified
in the American Embassy in Moscow.
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Inside that typewriter was
a structural piece of aluminum
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that went from one side
of the typewriter to the other.
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What the Soviets had done
through a shipping channel,
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uh, is basically took
the typewriters apart
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and replaced that bar with a bar
that looked exactly the same,
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but had been machined out.
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And discreet electronics had been put
inside that aluminum bar,
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which appeared on the surface to be solid,
but it actually was hollowed out.
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What the electronics would do,
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every single key that was typed
on the typewriter would be stored
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in a pretty small buffer inside that bar,
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and when the buffer was full,
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the contents of that buffer would be
transmitted through an RF signal
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to a nearby Soviet listening post.
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This went on for a decade at least.
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[narrator] The typewriter incident
became known as the Gunman Project.
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[Gosler] We ended up finding
about 16 of these things
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between the US embassies
in Moscow and Leningrad.
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We have to imagine those kinds
of operations being conducted
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against today's technology.
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And kind of the parallel would be the…
from the typewriter in Gunman
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to a software or hardware implant
in your laptop
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that's basically infinitely
more complex than that typewriter.
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We built a new embassy in Moscow
in the late 1970s,
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that was built by Russian labor
using Russian material,
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and before they started putting
the brickwork up for the walls,
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we did some examination of the columns
and beams and found out
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that almost every column and beam
had a gift in it from the Russians.
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There were microphones
in the exterior walls of the building.
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Many, many hundreds of microphones
were disconnected
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from the walls of the building.
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[tense music playing]
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The only way to make that building secure
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was to chop off the top three floors
or so of the building
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and throw it away and rebuild them
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using US labor and US material that was
pouched in from the United States.
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[narrator] The Russians aren't
the only ones doing the spying.
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The United States intelligence agencies
have done their fair share
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of surveillance activities
against the Russians as well.
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One operation codenamed Octopus
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targeted the Russian Embassy
in Washington.
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So the design for the Russian Embassy
had a large flat roof.
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And there were outside pipes
for the runoff from the roof.
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Well, the NSA arranged
for one section of pipe…
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for an optical illusion.
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You looked at it
and you thought it was empty,
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but actually the walls were thicker
in the middle.
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And in that one section of pipe,
they put a radio receiver,
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a small explosive charge,
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and a spool with hundreds of feet of wire.
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They connected all of the microphones
in the building at that point
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through the wall and attached them
to this one section of drainpipe.
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The key was, how do you
then get the wires out?
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And they waited for a summer rainstorm
in Washington,
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and they timed the thunder strikes
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to where the thunderbolt hit
near the embassy,
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at the same time they remotely triggered
a small explosion in the pipe.
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And it caused the parachute
to deploy into the drain.
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It quickly filled with water
and it flushed down into the drain system
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and it was trailed by two tiny wires
that were coming from the spool.
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Waiting for it down
in the underground drain system
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was a young FBI officer
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who was sitting there with a net
catching the parachute.
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He did.
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He got the wires and they had built
in a box right there at that point.
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They were able to connect the wires.
The wires went to an FBI listening post.
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And at that point,
they could recover digital audio
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from every room they'd targeted
inside the Russian Embassy.
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[narrator] Surveillance often requires
having to physically send an agent
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to hide a listening device
in remote and dangerous locations.
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One operation, called Operation Ivy Bells,
was conducted 400 feet underwater.
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The Soviets had installed
an unencrypted communication cable
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on the bottom of the Sea of Okhotsk
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between their most important naval base
and the Kremlin,
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believing it was completely secure.
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But the US Navy figured out
a way to break in.
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First they created a mixed gas
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which allowed the divers to dive
for prolonged periods of time.
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The navy divers would be transported
close to the site,
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then walk along the bottom of the sea
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in complete darkness
to the underwater cable.
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They found that they could put
an inductive clamp,
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which went around the cable,
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and it was able to copy any data
that passed through the cable.
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It had large recorders built in,
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and they would regularly send
a submarine.
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It would park on the bottom very nearby.
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They had a lockout system for divers.
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They would simply go out,
swap out the reels,
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put in fresh recording media,
head back to the sub, pop in.
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They'd head back,
and then they'd analyze it.
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[narrator] Dozens of different lines
ran through the cable,
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so they needed to separate them
in order to hear individual voices.
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Operation Ivy Bells proved to be
an intelligence goldmine,
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providing the US
with invaluable information
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00:15:01,320 --> 00:15:04,680
about the Soviet naval operation
for the next decade.
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00:15:07,200 --> 00:15:11,280
The creative minds of espionage
even have innovative solutions
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for conducting audio surveillance
when access is impossible.
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[Melton] The CIA had a target
of two Russians in Mexico City.
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The problem was, the area was secure.
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So someone had the idea to create
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a microphone and a transmitter
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inside a bullet, a projectile,
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and actually fire it from a gun
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00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:56,920
so it would embed itself in the tree
near where they'd be speaking
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00:15:57,000 --> 00:16:02,040
and would be able to pick up
communications and transmit it out.
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00:16:02,120 --> 00:16:06,600
And they were able
to successfully design a device
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00:16:06,680 --> 00:16:11,000
that could withstand the Gs of the force
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00:16:11,080 --> 00:16:15,040
as it was shot and it stopped suddenly
in the tree.
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00:16:16,040 --> 00:16:20,120
[narrator] Today listening devices can be
concealed almost anywhere,
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00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:23,560
and they've also become
even harder to detect.
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00:16:29,080 --> 00:16:33,640
The Nagra credit card
is one of the most effective
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00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:39,880
and sophisticated listening devices
available on the market.
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00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:42,480
[narrator] The Nagra CCR
is a device
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00:16:42,560 --> 00:16:45,760
developed by a Swiss company in 2013,
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00:16:45,840 --> 00:16:49,880
available only to law enforcement
and the intelligence community.
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00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:54,320
[Melton] It can be imprinted with
the face of an American Express card.
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00:16:54,400 --> 00:17:00,640
It could be imprinted with the face
of a standard US government badge
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00:17:00,720 --> 00:17:03,600
that you'd use for your credentials
to enter a building.
241
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Think how effective it could be if you're
wearing your ID badge around your neck
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but you've substituted the Nagra.
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Then anywhere you're walking,
you're digitally recording information
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and storing it internally
inside that card.
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And once you leave the premises,
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00:17:23,120 --> 00:17:27,200
you simply download it to a computer,
or you upload it to the cloud.
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Makes it just a particular threat
to an intelligence service.
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[narrator] High-tech listening devices
can pick up voices,
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store signals digitally,
and transmit that information
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to a listening post
almost anywhere in the world.
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[Richards] Well, the cell phone
is really problematic
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in the world of espionage,
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because, one, most of the time
you're being tracked.
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You can be tracked by your cell phone.
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So it is a real problem
from a security standpoint.
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00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:10,560
But it is a real boon as far as using it
for spying on other people.
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[Parrack]
Denied areas are typically places
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00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:18,400
that you're going to be
under surveillance or hostile control.
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00:18:18,480 --> 00:18:22,560
When we're traveling and we're taking
everything of importance to us…
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All of our digital information,
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00:18:24,320 --> 00:18:28,600
our credit cards, our passports now
have RFID chips.
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00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:32,520
Protecting that data becomes
more difficult.
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00:18:34,720 --> 00:18:38,400
So if you pass through a narrow portal…
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hypothetically, that little tunnel
that you walk through when you…
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before you get to immigrations and you've
always wondered why it's so narrow
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and it looks like an aluminum tunnel
that you're walking through…
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well, it's very possible that unless
your credit cards and passport
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are in a shielded pouch,
all the data's been sucked off.
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That does not necessarily mean
it will be manipulated,
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but your data has been taken.
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And the ability to put an RFID chip
and hide it on objects
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or hide it in your clothing
is a new piece of surveillance technology.
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[narrator] The benefit of bugging
and listening to your enemy
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is to obtain information
that can be used and passed on,
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00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:31,880
but being able to watch their activities
is just as important.
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00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:37,320
Intelligence agencies train
and employ special teams
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00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:43,240
to perform the role of visual surveillance
using handheld optical devices,
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00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:46,400
night vision equipment
and film and video cameras.
279
00:19:47,400 --> 00:19:50,480
Cameras may be set up
for long-term surveillance
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00:19:50,560 --> 00:19:56,400
or miniaturized for concealment
on the spy's body or on their belongings.
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[Richards] One of the things is, is a pen
that has a small camera in it.
282
00:20:01,640 --> 00:20:03,640
You could put it in your coat pocket.
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00:20:03,720 --> 00:20:08,560
There are subminiature cameras now
you can buy for under $100
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00:20:08,640 --> 00:20:12,920
that are so small you can place anywhere
and Wi-Fi them all over the world.
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00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:15,560
Those are the things
that we're dealing with today.
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They lend themselves
to a whole new type of spying.
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00:20:21,120 --> 00:20:25,560
[narrator] Having the capability to listen
in on your adversaries' secrets
288
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is a key strategy in espionage,
289
00:20:28,360 --> 00:20:33,240
but getting an aerial view
or eye-in-the-sky is crucial
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00:20:33,320 --> 00:20:37,240
in tracking the movement of targets,
military personnel
291
00:20:37,320 --> 00:20:39,320
and weaponry of the enemy.
292
00:20:46,760 --> 00:20:49,200
It's the wish of every person to say,
293
00:20:49,280 --> 00:20:53,920
"I wish I had that bird's-eye view,
or I could have my eye-in-the-sky,
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00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:58,200
because then I could see what's happening
over the next hill or in the next town."
295
00:20:58,280 --> 00:21:01,040
So satellites are today, literally,
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00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:04,360
an effective eye-in-the-sky.
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00:21:05,040 --> 00:21:10,880
Their weakness, however, is that it's
hard and expensive to move satellites.
298
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[whirring]
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00:21:14,720 --> 00:21:17,240
[atmospheric music playing]
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And what's replaced them is now drones.
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Drones with an extended range,
40, 42 hours.
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00:21:30,080 --> 00:21:35,840
They can hover in place and provide you
literally with that mobile eye-in-the-sky
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00:21:35,920 --> 00:21:37,520
that you can deploy,
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00:21:37,600 --> 00:21:42,040
have it anywhere you want,
and you're not risking a human pilot.
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00:21:42,120 --> 00:21:47,000
So, the modern-day drone is probably…
306
00:21:48,040 --> 00:21:52,080
the ideal eye-in-the-sky
for tactical situations.
307
00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:54,760
[indistinct communication over radio]
308
00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:57,120
[tense music playing]
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00:22:05,760 --> 00:22:08,080
[Richards] There are drones
that are very small,
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00:22:08,160 --> 00:22:10,840
that have been developed
by different agencies.
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00:22:10,920 --> 00:22:15,800
Again, whatever you're using has to be
practical for the job you're doing.
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00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,320
[narrator] Some advancements
in airborne surveillance systems
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00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:22,240
use wide-angle motion imagery
314
00:22:22,320 --> 00:22:27,440
which greatly expands the power that
a camera attached to a drone can have,
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00:22:27,520 --> 00:22:31,480
allowing it to track thousands
of moving targets at once,
316
00:22:31,560 --> 00:22:35,320
both forwards and backwards
and across cities.
317
00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:40,200
One system called the Gorgon Stare
is the ultimate eye-in-the-sky,
318
00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:45,160
a $15 million military surveillance drone
built by the Pentagon,
319
00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:48,080
intended to help prevent
terrorist attacks.
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00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:52,720
It can zoom in on particular parts
of the imagery on the ground
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00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:55,920
while being able
to record everything else.
322
00:22:56,440 --> 00:23:02,560
More impressive are its resolution
capabilities of 1.8 billion pixels,
323
00:23:02,640 --> 00:23:09,200
allowing for imagery resolution
150 times more powerful than an iPhone.
324
00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:16,600
The existence of secret
information-gathering programs
325
00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:19,440
by the US National Security Agency,
326
00:23:19,520 --> 00:23:23,120
leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013,
327
00:23:23,200 --> 00:23:25,360
shed light on the reach of surveillance,
328
00:23:25,440 --> 00:23:28,880
not just for national security
and espionage operations,
329
00:23:29,640 --> 00:23:31,960
but on the civilian population.
330
00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:38,320
One country that's collecting
detailed profiles on all of its citizens
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00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:42,840
by applying recent advances
in artificial intelligence and data mining
332
00:23:42,920 --> 00:23:45,560
to their surveillance capabilities
is China.
333
00:23:46,160 --> 00:23:49,880
Along with their robust arsenal
of surveillance devices,
334
00:23:49,960 --> 00:23:53,760
they've also developed drones
that look like real birds.
335
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:03,720
The robotic flock is so lifelike
that actual birds fly alongside them
336
00:24:03,800 --> 00:24:06,880
while it surveils the surrounding
and its citizens.
337
00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:09,280
Codenamed "Dove" by China,
338
00:24:09,360 --> 00:24:14,240
the birds are equipped with a camera,
GPS antenna and data link
339
00:24:14,320 --> 00:24:17,720
to communicate their findings
back to intelligence.
340
00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:21,760
In a case like China, you're seeing them
use modern Western-style technology
341
00:24:21,840 --> 00:24:23,720
and surveillance-related technologies
342
00:24:23,800 --> 00:24:26,920
to basically enact a social credit system
within their people.
343
00:24:27,000 --> 00:24:31,160
What that really is, is they're using
data to analyze everything about you
344
00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:33,240
in terms of who you are,
who do you talk to,
345
00:24:33,320 --> 00:24:35,800
what are your opinions,
what you blog about, what you search,
346
00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:39,720
what you like, what you not like, and that
assesses a credit or risk score to you.
347
00:24:39,800 --> 00:24:44,640
An example of how social credit systems
have been theorized to be used is,
348
00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,600
if you have a high credit,
you qualify for the best scholarships,
349
00:24:48,680 --> 00:24:51,160
the best jobs.
You're allowed to travel overseas.
350
00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:55,840
Uh, if you characterize or you hang out
with the wrong folks,
351
00:24:55,920 --> 00:24:59,120
or you post negative commentary
against the regime
352
00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:02,160
or the governmental policies,
your credit score takes a hit.
353
00:25:02,240 --> 00:25:05,760
What that means is, in some cases,
you can't qualify for certain jobs,
354
00:25:05,840 --> 00:25:08,840
you can't qualify for certain
academic institutions or loans,
355
00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:12,600
or in some cases, are restricted in terms
of where and when you can travel
356
00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:14,280
inside the country, let alone abroad.
357
00:25:14,360 --> 00:25:18,320
There's a certain bit of 1984 in terms
of what you're seeing happening in China.
358
00:25:18,400 --> 00:25:22,720
There's a lot of debate to what extent
this is being rolled out inside China,
359
00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:25,640
but there's no doubt that they are
actively using
360
00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:31,400
Western-developed technologies
that can be used for, in my opinion,
361
00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:32,880
for the good causes
362
00:25:32,960 --> 00:25:34,520
in terms of benefiting society.
363
00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:37,840
They're using it to restrict,
control, and monitor their people.
364
00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:49,040
[narrator] As digital technology
becomes more widespread,
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00:25:49,120 --> 00:25:51,880
the opportunities
for intelligence agencies
366
00:25:51,960 --> 00:25:54,720
to gather information grows as well.
367
00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:56,960
You can't go anywhere and do anything
368
00:25:57,040 --> 00:26:01,160
without leaving some trail or digital dust
of who you are and where you've been,
369
00:26:01,240 --> 00:26:04,400
whether it's cookies that correlate
back to your search results,
370
00:26:04,480 --> 00:26:08,000
whether it's travel patterns
based on where you log into the Internet
371
00:26:08,080 --> 00:26:09,600
or where you carry your smartphone.
372
00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:11,720
Who would have thunk 50 years ago
373
00:26:11,800 --> 00:26:14,680
that everyone would voluntarily
carry with them a beacon
374
00:26:14,760 --> 00:26:16,800
that would capture
every last bit of their lives?
375
00:26:16,880 --> 00:26:19,280
We kind of have that, a cell phone,
an Alexa,
376
00:26:19,360 --> 00:26:21,440
checking in on social media.
377
00:26:21,520 --> 00:26:25,720
That basically creates an overt playbook
378
00:26:25,800 --> 00:26:27,800
of what you're doing with your life.
379
00:26:29,240 --> 00:26:32,080
They pose challenges
for the collection world.
380
00:26:32,160 --> 00:26:34,200
How do you collect this information?
381
00:26:34,280 --> 00:26:37,720
How do you filter the wheat
from the chaff
382
00:26:37,800 --> 00:26:41,480
to get the high-tech information,
or the high-end interest information
383
00:26:41,560 --> 00:26:43,800
that you want out of all of this data?
384
00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:45,280
it's a challenging future.
385
00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:51,280
[narrator] Electronic surveillance
gives intelligence agencies insights
386
00:26:51,360 --> 00:26:55,640
into what is said, planned,
and anticipated by adversaries,
387
00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:58,840
but because such huge quantities
of communication
388
00:26:58,920 --> 00:27:00,560
now travel through the Internet,
389
00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:03,880
algorithms or other search methods
have been developed
390
00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:06,920
to process large amounts of collected data
391
00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:09,880
to identify specific
intelligence objectives
392
00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:12,280
like anticipating terrorist attacks
393
00:27:12,880 --> 00:27:17,440
and gaining the advantage on
the foreign policy plans of adversaries.
394
00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:22,000
[Gosler] One thing that we have to do
within the United States is make sure
395
00:27:22,080 --> 00:27:25,800
that all parts of the government
work together as an integrated team.
396
00:27:25,880 --> 00:27:29,840
[Melton] So, at the Naval Academy
the motto is,
397
00:27:29,920 --> 00:27:34,880
Ex tridens scientia,
"Through knowledge, sea power."
398
00:27:34,960 --> 00:27:39,520
Well, I would say,
through knowledge, intelligence services
399
00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:42,640
will become ever more efficient at spying,
400
00:27:43,240 --> 00:27:45,000
as well as at catching spies.
401
00:27:45,080 --> 00:27:47,840
[atmospheric music playing]
34827
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